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ABSTRACT
THE CONTOURS OF POST-COLD WAR TURKISH-AMERICAN 
RELATIONS, (1990-2001)
Tekdemir, Sevinç
MIR in International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
November 2004
The nature of post-Cold War decade Turkish-American relations has largely been 
determined by the new strategic circumstances that also have stared to frame world 
politics. In this decade, new challenges and opportunities brought together new areas 
of cooperation for the U.S. and Turkey by strengthening their alliance within NATO. 
Hence, the mutual importance attributed to the relationship has flourished as a result 
o f the essentiality of their alliance. Neither the U.S. nor Turkey could afford to lose a 
significant ally with whom they share common interests in the region. Furthermore, 
it could be argued that these allies will need each other in the future to realize their 
foreign policy objectives concerning the relations with the neighboring countries. 
Thus, the simpler approach to the thesis is analyzing the exogenous and indigenous 
factors that affect the character of Turkish-American relations in the post-Cold War 
era.
Keywords: The nature of Turkish-American relations, post-Cold War period, 
globalization, strategic partnership, the Middle East, Balkans, ‘special relationship’. 
Equal footing, interdependence
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ÖZET
SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİNİN DIŞ
HATLARI, (1990-2001)
Tekdemir, Sevinç
Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
Kasım 2004
Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin tabiatını dünya siyasetini 
de şekillendirmeye başlayan yeni stratejik şartlar büyük ölçüde belirlemiştir. Bu 
dönem, Türkiye’nin ve ABD’nin NATO’daki ortaklığım sağlamlaştınrken yeni 
meydan okuyuşlar ve fırsatlar onlar için yeni işbirliği alanları oluşturdu. Bu yüzden, 
bu ilişkiye verilen karşılıklı önem ortaklığın gerekliliğini de arttırdı. Bölgede 
paylaştıkları ortak çıkarlardan dolayı ne ABD ne de Türkiye bu önemli müttefığini 
kaybetmeye katlanabilirdi. Bu nedenle, komşu devletlerle olan ilişkileri konusunda 
bu iki müttefiğin gelecekte de dış politika hedeflerini gerçekleştirmek için birbirine 
ihtiyaç duyacakları söylenebilir. Bunun için, bu tezin temel yaklaşımı Soğuk Savaş 
sonrası dönemde Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin niteliğini etkileyen dışsal ve içsel 
faktörleri analiz etmektir.
A nahtar Kelimeler: Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin tabiatı. Soğuk Savaş sonrası 
dönem, küreselleşme, stratejik ortaklık, Orta Doğu, Balkanlar, “özel ilişki”, eşit 
koşullar, karşılıklı bağımlılık
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
After World War II ended in 1945, the international order was organized in 
accordance with the bipolar division of the West and East. Relations among states 
were primarily shaped according to the camp to which they belonged. Relations 
between two states belonging to or supporting different blocs were usually minimal. 
Each bloc viewed the other as an existential threat. However, starting in the early 
eighties and reaching to a peak in late eighties. Cold War orientations began to lose 
their effectiveness and even to lose their meaning. The fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 
became the major sign pointing to dissolution of the bipolar world. Thus, the Cold 
War period ended and the last decade of the 20"’ century arose as an important period 
o f transition in which a new world order was to emerge.
Cold-War circumstances had a deep impact on the nature of U.S-Turkish 
relations. In this regard, the end of the Cold War led to new circumstances, which 
presented many challenges and opportunities. Therefore, it would be necessary to 
analyze the relations between Turkey and the United States, which not only 
intensified but also diversified. The changing nature of the international order has 
introduced new exogenous factors, which were latent or did not exist during the Cold 
War. These exogenous factors could be associated with the problems facing Turkey 
in geopolitical terms. It would be essential to view how Washington and Ankara 
would continue their relations in the absence of Cold War considerations, which 
closely tied Turkey and the U.S.
The primary concern of the thesis is to look at the nature of post-Cold War 
U.S.-Turkish relations and to understand what major issues have caused a 
reorientation. It is noteworthy to cite the main characteristics that have shaped 
Turkish-American relations in a period of change that may lead to the emergence of 
a new world order mainly dominated by the U.S., the only remaining superpower.
Throughout the analysis, rather than recounting the events that Washington 
and Ankara experienced in the nineties concerning bilateral ties, the focus will be on 
major contours that shaped the characteristics of U.S.-Turkish relations. It is 
important to analyze post-Cold War ties for Ankara to be able to prepare itself for the 
new millennium since this decade, as a transition and preparation for the 2U‘ century 
would give clues about the content of the relations in the future. Different from Cold 
War conditions, new regions and opportunities would be influencing Turkish-U.S. 
relations, and this might bring another dimension to their bilateral ties. The impact of 
global and regional developments might lead to a change in the nature of U.S.- 
Turkish relations.
The period, in which the U.S.-Turkish relations, is to be examined is the 
decade between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001. Here it is 
important to explain why this decade is selected for the purposes of this thesis. Many 
scholars have already examined different periods of U.S.-Turkish relations.' Among 
different periods in U.S.-Turkish relations, the nineties has been the less analyzed 
period; however, this period requires specific attention. Two major turning points 
have marked this decade. With the collapse o f communist ideology following the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and appearance of new independent states this decade distanced
' For details on U.S.-Turkish relations see Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign 
Policy o f  Turkey. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Uniyersity Press, 1971), Nasuh Uslu, Türk- 
Amerikan İlişkileri. (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000), and Baskın Oran, Türk Dıs Politikası:
itself from the Cold War period. On the other side, with the terrorist attack on 
September 11, 2001, this decade was also distanced from the post-September 11- 
period, which could be accepted as a new era. Therefore, with regard to the 
evaluation of U.S.-Turkish relations this decade between two significant processes 
influencing the fate of world politics is worthwhile in terms of examining U.S.- 
Turkish relations.
In this period, the newly emerging global and regional changes during the 
nineties caused a reexamination of the basic characteristics that formed U.S.-Turkish 
chain of relations. Mainly security oriented U.S.-Turkish relations might have lost 
their significance in the post-Cold War era after the demise of the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, Turkey’s role as a NATO ally might have decreased in a period when no 
need was felt for NATO. However, U.S. efforts to transform NATO into a collective 
security organization would necessitate different analyses of the nature of U.S.- 
Turkish relations. Therefore, the major issues debated in this period redefining the 
U.S.-Turkish relations would be crucial. During the nineties, both Washington and 
Ankara used the concept of partnership frequently; however, there was never an 
official agreement recognizing Turkey as the strategic partner of the U.S. Moreover, 
most probably there was even a gap in the understanding of the U.S. and Turkey as 
to what it meant to be a strategic partner.
In this context, this study intends to contribute to the debate over whether 
Turkey and the U.S. are strategic partners or not, and also it aims at bringing a 
compact analysis of whether the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. qualifies 
as a partnership or not by emphasizing the conditions on which this relationship is 
based.
Kurtuluş Savasından Bugüne Okular. Belgeler. Yorumlar. Vol. 1-2, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
2001).
In this period of examination, in the ehanging and at the same time evolving 
world politics, U.S.-Turkish relations have acquired a new pace different from the 
Cold War. With this fact in mind, the initial question that guided the study was to 
view and analyze the fundamentals of U.S.-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War 
era. It will be necessary to examine the basic global and regional factors that 
influenced U.S.-Turkish relations in this decade before drawing a conclusion of what 
really characterized the nature of this relationship.
Along the study, how and why Turkey and the U.S. are significant to each 
other will be explored. Whether being allies in NATO is the main force that brings 
them together in many areas of regional confrontation or cooperation will be 
discussed. Besides this, another debate of the study will be focusing on to what 
extent Turkey is essential for the U.S. and its global and regional interests in the 
world, and to what extent the U.S. is important for Turkey and its regional interests. 
It is significant to investigate under which conditions the U.S., as the only global 
power in the beginning of the decade, and Turkey, as an emerging regional power in 
the nineties, were brought together.
It could be argued that in a world where globalization was spreading rapidly 
and bringing all countries within the scope of its rules, the areas in which the 
interests of Turkey and the U.S. would intersect increased in the post-Cold War era. 
New opportunities for cooperation in the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and 
Central Asia arose for Turkey and the U.S. The guiding principle of cooperation in 
these fields was one of common interest. Therefore, for the U.S., Turkey’s 
significance should be evaluated in terms of Ankara’s contribution to U.S. interests 
and vice versa in order to meaningfully identify their bilateral ties.
Here it is important to mention some major difficulties faced during the 
preparation of this study. With regard to the analysis of the post-Cold War Turkish- 
American relations, a crucial difficulty has been the afore-mentioned fact that the 
number of exogenous factors increased and further complicated the relations. While 
the level of analysis was once the existence of a single enemy, now the levels of 
analysis have increased geometrically after the end of the Cold War. This difficulty 
of analysis also lives in the boundaries of the topic. The exogenous nature of the 
factors directly influencing the relations between the two countries makes the 
analysis multi-faceted and more complicated. Hence, it is important first to examine 
these exogenous factors in order to simplify the evaluation. In general, the relations 
between any combinations of two countries are basically determined by indigenous 
factors, which can be examined by considering internal factors associated with the 
country in question. And basically these factors are generally more manageable in 
designing foreign relations. However, with regard to the relations of Turkey with the 
U.S., the indigenous factors are secondary to those exogenous factors and the 
existing domestic factors that shape the relations are directly influenced by outside 
factors.
Another difficulty regarding this thesis is the fact that academic resources 
such as articles, books, and Internet documents are mainly of American origin and 
generally reflect the perspectives of American experts. The number of studies by 
Turkish academics and experts is limited and their studies are also generally based on 
the views distilled from U.S. research. In order not to be lost in American point of 
view, the thesis tried to protect its objectivity by taking into account every bit of 
analysis related to the topic.
In order to be more specific about the entire study and the above- 
mentioned purposes, the project was divided into five chapters. After the 
introduction, there are four chapters in which the subject and the main arguments are 
examined in further detail. The second chapter focuses on the impact of global and 
regional developments on U.S.-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era. First of 
all, the major changes that led to the new decade were discussed to see how the post- 
Cold War decade differed from the Cold War. Later the search for a “new world 
order” was identified. Following came the sections in which the last decade of the 
20*'' century was depicted as a period of transition in world politics, and later some 
rising powers that might become partners for the U.S. in this decade were listed. 
Finally, Turkey’s preparedness to encounter all these developments in world politics 
was discussed by emphasizing areas on which U.S.-Turkish relations would be 
concentrated during this decade.
The third chapter focuses on U.S.-Turkish relations by pointing to different 
factors affecting their bilateral ties. The first concern to be discussed was the main 
characteristics of the relationship and later what the requirements of a strategic 
partnership are. In this respect, U.S.-Turkish relations regarding areas of cooperation 
in the Balkans were taken up first. Secondly, common objectives but different 
policies regarding the Middle Eastern countries’ impact on U.S.-Turkish relations are 
examined. Thirdly, Armenian and Greek problems have been two areas with real 
conflicts and confrontations. Fourthly, comes the section of major compromise about 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline route between Turkey and the U.S. because of the 
common interests in the region; however, which has not reached a conclusion. The 
fifth section deals with Turkish foreign initiatives, namely, military cooperation with 
Israel; the Arab-Israeli peace process; Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone;
South-Eastern European Brigade; and Turkey’s EU membership supported by the 
U.S. The sixth and seventh sections are concerned with U.S. reservations about 
Turkey and Turkish reservations about U.S. in the region. All these issues helped 
characterize the nature of their relationship.
The fourth chapter starts with the mutual importance of the U.S.-Turkish 
relationship. Although the significance of Turkey is highlighted by the U.S., 
Washington also had doubts about a “new Turkey” emerging in the nineties. 
Following comes the section in which U.S. policies toward Turkey are discussed. 
Later, starting with the Clinton administration and continuing with the Bush 
administration, some major policy changes are described. In the following three 
sections the concept of strategic partnership is put forward concerning Turkey’s 
partnership with the U.S. Finally, the fifth chapter is the conclusion and there, the 
final outcomes of the analyses are presented.
As a result of the analyses made on the contours of U.S.-Turkish relations, it 
could be claimed that the new opportunities and challenges of the post-Cold War era 
strengthened the mutual importance of their relationship. During this decade, Turkey 
and the U.S. cooperated in new areas such as the Balkans, Middle East, and 
Caucasus in addition to the already existing bilateral ties between these two NATO 
allies. Thus, the areas of cooperation widened the horizons of U.S.-Turkish 
relationship, and also diversified the characteristics of U.S.-Turkish alliance. The 
improved significance of NATO increased the essentiality of U.S.-Turkish alliance 
within NATO, since as loyal and reliable allies, the U.S. and Turkey worked hard 
together to preserve stability and peace in the Balkans and Middle East. Hence this 
contribution of the U.S. and Turkey accelerated NATO’s role and duty in world 
politics as an organization concerned with collective security.
On the other hand, the post-Cold war years brought onto the agenda the 
concept of strategic partnership between the U.S. and Turkey by focusing on the 
developing character o f their relationship. Whether to call Turkey a strategic partner 
for the U.S. or not was debated for a long time, and the debate continues. However, 
the most significant debate should focus on whether it has been desirable for Turkey 
to be a strategic partner of the U.S. When compared to the U.S. “special” relationship 
with UK or Israel, it was explicitly viewed that there was a difference from that of 
the relationship of the U.S. and Turkey. Moreover, the requirements of being a 
strategic partner did not suit Turkey’s role well in its region. Hence, it was also seen 
that there was not a necessity to categorize the U.S.-Turkish relations within a 
strategic partnership since for decades they have already been allies through NATO.
Nonetheless, it was also noteworthy that the U.S. could not afford to lose 
Turkey and its support in the region. On the other side, Turkey could not really 
afford to lose U.S. support if it wanted to become more powerful in the region and to 
realize its foreign policy objectives, either. Hence, it was seen that these two states 
needed each other’s support in regional policies, and it could be concluded that 
during the nineties the U.S.-Turkish relationship has flourished and demonstrated to 
the world that this alliance will continue as long as their interests overlap in the 
following periods.
CHAPTER 2
THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
ON U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR
2.1 The Initial Changes of the New Decade
With the Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev coming into power in 1985 the 
Soviet Union started to give signals that it would end the rivalry between the Soviets 
and Americans that damaged the two sides. Thus, Gorbachev himself announced the 
economic reforms called “Perestroika” and political reforms called “Glasnost” to 
restructure and modernize the Communist-based Soviet system. These initiatives of 
Gorbachev were welcomed by the world and especially by its main rival, the U.S. 
Furthermore, the continuing Soviet efforts to decrease international tensions caused 
by the bipolar division of the world reduced the historic Soviet horrors in the eyes of 
the American people by bringing an end to the Cold War era.^
Historians like Mary Beth Norton have pointed out four trends that led to the 
end of the Cold War. Accordingly, first the cost of the Cold War accelerated to such 
a high level that this decreased the domestic expenditures both in the Soviet Union 
and the U.S. leading to the dissatisfaction of their people. The second trend was the 
challenge to two major powers from their own spheres of influence. While France 
was distancing itself from the USA by its withdrawal from the military wing of 
NATO in 1967, the Czech and Hungarian uprisings decreased the unity among the 
communist states, and this increased the necessity of détente. Thirdly, the increasing
 ^Mary Beth Norton et al, A People and A Nation: A History o f the United States. Fourth edition, Vol. 
II. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), p. 914.
power of the Third World as a strong rival and an alternative to both the capitalist 
West and Communist East brought the U.S. and Soviets closer to détente. Finally, 
international pressure to stop the nuclear rivalry between the Soviet Union and the 
U.S. was followed by a period of declining tension on arms race.^
One of the very first signs that pointed to the end of the Cold War between 
the capitalist West and the communist East came with the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
on October 2, 1989. This wall was an important symbol of the East-West division of 
the world. Hence, after the collapse of the wall, the two German states were 
reunified. Furthermore, the Soviet president declared that his country would not 
interfere with the other Eastern European countries’ regimes and governments. Such 
a declaration increased independence movements in the Baltic States, and later in the 
Caucasian and Central Asian states by leading to the break-up of the Soviet empire.
The Soviet Union was dissolved after the former Soviet republics got their 
independence one after another especially following Gorbachev’s denouncement of 
Communist ideology. The Central Asian and Caucasian republics followed the Baltic 
states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and the legal successor o f the union became 
the Russian Federation.^ Nevertheless, these newly independent states became new 
actors of the post-Cold War era and their contribution to world politics would be 
measured according to the role they would take in international politics in the 
following years. Especially the Caucasian states with their natural resources would 
gain a significant role in the relations between the great powers, and between the 
U.S. and Turkey, both of whom wanted to prevent Russian dominance over the 
region.
 ^Mary Beth Norton et al, p. 915.
Mary Beth Norton et al, p. 914. 
 ^ Ibid.
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On the other side of Europe, in the Balkans, the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
and the following wars among the independent states created another “powder keg” 
in Europe by threatening stability and peace all over the continent and even in the 
neighboring regions. Serbian aggression came with the leadership of Slobodan 
Milosevic, who declared Serbia the legal successor of Yugoslavia. However, he 
misused his power and initiated “ethnic cleansing” towards the Muslim population of 
the independent state of Bosnia Herzegovina and later towards Albanians in 
autonomous Kosovo.^ Nonetheless, not only the geographic location of these Balkan 
wars but also the human rights issue attracted the attention first of Turkey, because of 
its historic ties, and later of the U.S., anxious about peace in Europe. Thus, under the 
guidance of the U.S., the Serbian aggression came to an end with Dayton Peace 
Accord in 1995 in Bosnia. Later in 1999, NATO air strikes stopped Milosevic in 
Kosovo and Kosovo returned to the pre-war circumstances under the protection of 
Kosovo Force (KFOR).^
In these two operations of crisis management, Turkey pointed out to its allies 
and especially to the U.S. that Ankara was a reliable ally. Moreover, Turkey 
demonstrated its military power and how useful it was and it would be in such crises. 
For the Western countries and especially for the Europeans having Turkey on their 
side in European conflicts would be beneficial. Hence, this was a clear message sent 
to the world and especially to the European Union that Turkey possessed the 
commitment to counter aggression if necessary. Though it cannot be argued that the 
acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy to the EU in Helsinki Summit at the very end of 
1999 was a direct result of Turkey’s role in Kosovo, this could be acknowledged as
Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use o f  American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World. 
Revised Edition, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 37-43.
’ ibid, pp. 164-67.
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one of the influential reasons lying behind the response given for Turkey’s 
contribution to the Kosovar crisis.
Finally, the Gulf War of 1991 between the Iraqi forces and the coalition 
forces under the leadership of the U.S. military was another sign that the Cold War 
ended and a new world order was emerging. With this war, the U.S. confirmed its 
rising hegemonic power all over the world while it was also celebrating the demise 
of its main enemy and rival, the Soviet Union. The Bush administration was very 
much aware of the threat that might be posed by Iraq if it possessed the entire control 
of the Persian Gulf oil routes. Hence, the U.S. initiated Operation Desert Storm on 
January 16, 1991 to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and liberate the Kuwaiti 
people from Iraqi invasion. This success was a good opportunity to overcome the 
Vietnam syndrome of the American people and also make them forget domestic
Q
economic problems. Nevertheless, leaving Saddam in power -although liberating 
Kuwait was the main objective in the Gulf War not ousting Saddam- might have 
been the most significant shortcoming of George Bush that would reoccur on the 
U.S. agenda in the following years. Moreover, Iraq would become one of the major 
conflicts in the Middle East disturbing the U.S. national interests; thus, the successor 
of Bush, Bill Clinton, would become involved in the region. Contrary to his 
predecessor, Clinton would not directly enter into a war with Saddam Hussein; yet, 
he would be strict towards him in different ways. He would employ economic 
sanctions and he would demand Saddam accept UN specialists’ in Iraq, who would 
monitor “potential” Iraqi reactors in case that they might be producing nuclear 
energy or military arsenal.
' Mary Beth Norton and et al, pp. 1068-69.
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Turkey also followed a more assertive foreign policy toward Iraq with the 
Gulf War since it sided with the U.S. in the war. As Burcu Bostanoglu pointed out, 
Turkey had to formulate a more active foreign policy in the region despite the fact 
that Turgut Ozal received a lot of criticism on the issue. Turkey had only two 
alternatives: either to side with the U.S. and the coalition powers or to remain 
inactive, which would amount to support Saddam Hussein, who was depicted as an 
aggressor by all the countries. Hence, despite slight domestic opposition that did not 
offer any alternative political propositions, OzaTs pro-active foreign policy seemed 
to be the best choice. In addition to this, as a requirement of “realist” politics, Ozal 
wanted to demonstrate with this war that Turkey did not lose its significance and also 
that Turkey would exert its weight over regional disputes as a rising regional power. 
Thus, by producing a decisive and more active foreign policy, Ozal evaluated the 
costs and benefits of the war, and decided that siding with the coalition forces was 
the most convenient option because of promised Western economic support. 
Nevertheless, after the war Turkey suffered a lot economically as the promises given 
by the U.S. and the other Western countries were not kept.'’ Finally and more 
crucially, after the war ended, Turkey had to face one of the biggest problems of the 
region that occupied and still occupies the agenda of the Turkish government: the 
Kurdish issue in the northern part of Iraq threatening Turkey’s territorial integrity by 
becoming a legacy of the Gulf War.
To summarize the initial changes of the new decade, it could be claimed that 
no state was really ready to encounter such revolutionary changes, yet it was also 
clear that some countries at least were politically and economically strong enough to 
decrease the threats that might come as a result of changing dynamics of world
’ Burcu Bostanoglu, Tiirkivc-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası (The Politics o f  U.S.-Turkish Relations). 
(Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999), pp. 404-07.
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politics. Hence in an atmosphere of declining Soviet power and Communism, the 
U.S. benefited from the situation and without a major rival as it had during the Cold 
War the U.S. intervened in Middle East conflicts to improve its power in world 
politics. Therefore, all incidents that occurred at the beginning of the decade, starting 
with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and following with the Gulf war, the demise of 
the Soviet Union, and the dissolution of Yugoslavia served U.S. interests since it was 
left as a single superpower. Hence, this superpower initiated a search for establishing 
a new world order based mainly on U.S. rules.
2.2 Search for a New World Order
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which had been one of the major signs 
of the two bloc-world order during the Cold War era, the world entered a new period 
with many other changes and developments which were to shape world politics. This 
new period was named the “post-Cold War era” because it not only ended the bipolar 
world order, but it was also the beginning of another world order based on uni­
polarity according to some and multi-polarity according to others. Moreover, all the 
vital changes of world politics at the beginning of the decade left the United States as 
the sole superpower. Thus, the U.S. administration under the presidency of George 
Bush, Sr. appreciated the historical opportunity of being the only superpower of the 
world and initiated the Gulf War against the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, with the 
objective of liberating Kuwait under Iraqi occupation. During this war, the U.S. and 
especially President Bush gained confidence in their military as well as economic 
and political power so that George Bush declared in a speech at the U.S. Congress
that the world was about to face a “New World Order”.10
Baskin Oran (ed.), “1990-2001: Küreselleşme Ekseninde Türkiye (Turkey at the Axis o f  
Globalization)” in Türk Dis Politikası: Kurtuluş Savasından Bugüne Olcular. Belgeler. Yorumlar. 
1980-2001.Vol. 2. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 210.
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The concept of a “New World Order” was not really new because it was also 
used after the First and Second World Wars while creating the League of Nations 
and the United Nations respectively. Contrary to this notion, according to some 
realists, the international order is full of anarchy and disorder rather than order.'* 
Hence, Baskin Oran taking off from neo-realists, talked about the post-Cold War era 
as a “New World Disorder”.'^ Nevertheless, the most significant part here was that 
the U.S. started to make its power felt by focusing on the fact that it was after 
leadership of the world since Washington understood that it was the single country 
which was capable of framing new rules for the global world.
Moreover, like his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, Bush believed in the 
‘“American moral responsibility’ and its right to intervene, by force if necessary, 
whenever and wherever a member of the international system violates its set rules, 
functions, and procedures. More unacceptable yet, the president has claimed that the 
United States was the only country on earth that has the means to back it up.” '  ^
Hence, the U.S. quest for world leadership became one of the primary reasons to be 
involved in the war against Iraq. By defeating Iraq, the U.S. wanted to reduce the 
Iraqi threat of gaining power in the Middle East. Iraq was threatening the security 
and the balance in the region in general, and threatening the existence and security of 
Israel in particular. Thus the U.S., in the name of protecting the interests of its
" Neo-Realists argued that international structure is composed o f  an anarchic system. It brings out the 
notion that anarchy is the absence o f political authority. Nco-Rcalists like Kenneth Waltz developed 
“structural realism” in which they dealt about the anarchic structure o f the international system. In the 
post-Cold War era, within this framework, the concept o f “New World Disorder” was developed. For 
details on Waltz’s ideas sec his book Theory o f International Politics. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979). Also see Medley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics. (London: 
Macmillan, 1977).
Baskin Oran, “Effects o f Globalization on Turkey”, (cd.) Mustafa Aydın in TURKEY at the 
Threshold o f the 21st Century: Global Encounters and /vs Regional Alternatives. (Ankara: 
International Relations Foundation, 1998), pp. 184-86.
Hooshang Amirahmadi, (ed.) “Global Restructuring, The Persian Gulf War, and the U.S. Quest for 
World Leadership”, in The United States and the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives. 
(Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1993), p. 415. Also quoted from “Lunging for War”, 
New York Times (May, 5 1991) (editorial).
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Western allies, the free flow of oil, and petro-capital,'"’ activated some Western 
countries. Under UN mandate, a coalition of Western forces was formed, and this 
coalition with the leadership of the U.S. fought the troops of Saddam Hussein, who 
refused to surrender at first but retreated from Kuwait later, when he understood that 
he could not defeat the coalition forces.
The initial success in the Persian Gulf would increase U.S. prospects of 
continuing its leadership role wherever the U.S. interests were at stake. The U.S. 
administration and President Bush followed a more traditional foreign policy unlike 
Ronald Reagan (who was deeply influenced by the neo-conservatives); however, the 
Persian Gulf War seemed to be in harmony with the Neo-Conservatives’ ideas that 
the U.S. should use its global military power to spread its values.'^ Thus when 
George Bush released the speech on the new world order he knew that he could 
benefit from this speech in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy both at home and 
abroad. Its tone was impressive and persuasive for people at home and abroad. Bush 
even could “end the rising criticism against [his] administration for not developing a 
clear-cut new American paradigm of world leadership and for supposedly assuming 
an anti-Israeli stand in the Arab-lsraeli Conflict”.'*’ According to Bush, the new 
world order he proposed to everybody was ‘“a world order in which the principles of 
justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong; a world where the United 
Nations freed from Cold War stalemate is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its 
founders; a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among
Hooshang Amirahmadi, pp. 364-65.
James J. Zogby, “How the Neo-Conservatives Operate”, Yurica Report, July 02, 2003. 
www.yuricareport.com/PoliticalAnalysis(ZogbyHow NcoConsOpcratc.html For more additional 
information on neo-conservarives and their ideas sec hllo://straitstiincs.asial.com.s»/. 
wvvw.counlcmunch.org/baiTvl 115.html.
wvvw.l0brinstcr.com/roderoos/ncws/nc\vs.itcm.asr)?Ne\vslD--345. Thomas DiLorenzo, “The Political 
Economy of World Domination” from httn://ww\v.lcwrockwcll.com/dilorcnzo/dilorcnzo47.html. 
Hooshang Amirahmadi, p. 365.
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all nations. The Gulf war put this new world to its first test. My fellow Americans, 
we passed the test.’” ' ’
When we look at world politics during 1990-2001, it may be concluded that 
the U.S. did everything to “justify” its global existence and power at least in the eyes 
of its people by intervening in most important incidents around the world. The world 
had seen the U.S. in Somalia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq, and many other 
places after the Persian Gulf War of 1991, sometimes emphasizing the issue of 
ending ethnic cleansing, stopping tribal disputes, or preventing a country going 
nuclear. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the U.S. was interfering in different areas, 
it could not be claimed that Washington had no objective in its foreign policy. 
Furthermore, just after the Gulf War in August 1991, the U.S. administration 
prepared the U.S. National Security Strategy in which it was clearly seen that the 
U.S. would aid countries which required help, but they would be involved only in 
issues that were directly related to U.S. interests.
Making such a division could be interpreted as a U.S. awakening to the fact 
that as the single superpower the most important issue was security of the state itself, 
and the regions in which U.S. interests were at s tak e .H e n ce  the U.S. did not 
intervene in most of the African wars, in which thousands of people died, because 
the U.S. did not see any gain, but intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo wars because 
these wars threatened the stability and peace of Western Europe, which was 
significant for U.S. economic and political relations with the Western allies. Thus it 
was understood that in the post-Cold War world there was a double standard in the
Hooshang Amirahmadi, pp. 366-67. The author also quotes from New York Times (March 7, 1991), 
p. A8.
Çağn Erhan, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası ABD’nin Güvenlik Algılamaları (Post Cold War U.S. Security 
Perccptions)’’,(eds.) Refet Yinanç & Hakan Taşdemir in Uluslararası Güvenlik Sorunları ve Türkiye 
(International Security Problems and Turkey). (Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2002), pp. 64-65. For the
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use of American military force, since the U.S. did not keep the promise it gave as a 
global power when it was introducing the new world order to the world. The U.S. did 
not assist the weak in Africa who were suffering from the inequalities of 
globalization, which increased enormously after the recent developments in new 
technologies.
2.3 A Decade of Transition
When the period from 1990 to 2001 is analyzed thoroughly, one can conclude that 
there have been real changes and developments in world politics after the Cold War. 
Moreover, the appearance of significant issues such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
Persian Gulf War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
following each other like the domino effect, left the U.S. as the only global power 
that did not really have time to deal with abstractions but to take control over 
concrete issues such as dealing with the new political order, itself.
Despite the lack of special conceptualization of the post-Cold war years, it 
would not be an exaggeration to state that some politicians and academics depicted 
the aftermath up until the turning point of September 11, 2001 as a “Decade of 
Transition and Preparation”. Throughout the 1990s, it was seen that the U.S. 
increased its military, economic and political power by benefiting from the post-Cold 
War circumstances and by introducing globalization''^ to the world, which was 
mostly in the service of U.S. interests. However, even the U.S. was aware of the fact
original text o f the U.S. National Security Strategy sec the document from 
http://www.fas.Org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm
” Globalization: Although there arc many ways to define globalization, it could be accepted that 
globalization is a combination o f different variables. Within the text, globalization in politics and 
economics is referred. Hence, democratization and libcralition, arc two fundamental issues forming 
globalization. For a more compact definition Baskin Oran proposes that “globalization is the spread of  
Western subculture, which includes international capitalism, and the Western superstructure, which 
involves rationalism, democracy, human and minority rights to the whole world”, “1980-1990: Batı
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that nations and their people needed some transitional time to get accustomed to the 
new international order in which the U.S. would reign. I hus, this new period, which 
was also the last decade of the 20"' century, became, as Paul Kennedy named it, “a 
preparatory period for the 2K' century”.·** The U.S. was very determined to define 
the political parameters of the new world order such that every event in international 
politics became another step for the United States to reach its foreign policy 
objectives. The U.S. could get closer to its objectives through globalization and 
military power as it had been in the Gulf War and Balkan Crises. Furthermore, the 
U.S. used even the smallest issue in this period of transition to help meet its ideal of 
becoming a hegemonic power.
The post-Cold War years were a part of transition the world was not 
experiencing for the first time, yet the rules of the order were not decided yet. There 
were different wars in human history that gave clues about how new world orders 
were established in the previous centuries. For instance after the Thirty-Years war, 
the Westphalia Peace System was built (1648), the League of Nations followed 
World War I (1918), and finally the United Nations system came as a result of the 
Second World War (1945).^' In such a sequence of diplomatic history, it was 
reasonable to wait for a new order after the Cold War ended. Nevertheless, this time 
there was a common understanding between the countries that there was great 
necessity for a transition period. Hence, all states needed time to get accustomed to 
the new circumstances that would affect all of them in different ways. All nations
Bloku Ekseninde Tiirkiye-2”, in Türk Dis Politikası.... p. 10. For details see also Küreselleşme vc 
Azınlıklar. (Globalization and Minorities), (Ankara: İmaj Yayınevi, 2001).
■*’ Çağrı Erhan, p. 57.
■' Ahmet Davutoğlıı, Editör, CNN Türk, 17.02.2004. The TV program entitled Editör M CNN Türk is 
prepared as a live program during the week at 19 oo p.m. This Program usually deals with the issues 
on the agenda o f domestie and foreign affairs.
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would be influenced by this change in the global world politically, militarily, socially 
or economically.
One of the most significant properties that shaped the decade was that it 
sometimes included and even celebrated opposing ideas and processes. In this decade 
of transition full of vital political incidents, the international scene witnessed both 
integration and disintegration at the same time in Europe. On the one hand. Western 
European countries were preparing to increase the level of integration and to increase 
solidarity among the members in terms of politics, military and security issues beside 
economics in order to create a real sense of a strong European Union functioning as 
protector of all the rights of its members.
A crucial example of disintegration that affected the fate of almost all nations 
in the world occurred in the Soviet Union. On this occasion, the world was lucky 
since the former Soviet republics got their independence without war. Not only the 
European republics but also those in the Caucasus and Central Asia got their political 
independence from the former Soviet Union peacefully, which then became the 
Russian Federation.
On the other hand, the Balkans experienced the calamity of ethnic 
nationalism and independence. These states were driven into real wars between and 
among each other because they could not resolve their problems by negotiation. Thus 
the international community had to be involved in these conflicts as mediators or 
even as active participants in the war against Slobodan Milosevic, then president of 
the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia.
All these movements of integration and disintegration were very influential in 
international politics. Nonetheless, their significance played and would play a great 
role in relations between the U.S. as a main actor of world politics and Turkey,
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which not only had historical and cultural tics with the newly independent states, but 
also wanted to establish economic relations. Hence, during the 1990s the U.S.- 
Turkish interests converged most of the time in the Balkans, Caucasus and Central 
Asia, Europe and Middle East because the U.S. as a hegemonic power was also 
interested in all these areas, which had economic and political prospects for a country 
like the U.S.
Another characteristic of the 1990s and the international structure was that 
the international community observed a decade of peace agreements compared to 
Cold War circumstances because of the ethnic strife in the Balkans.^“ The ethnic war 
in Bosnia Herzegovina, where Serbs slaughtered thousands of Muslim Bosniaks, was 
one of the major incidents that drew worldwide attention. There was a widespread 
support to stop the crimes and genocide perpetrated by the Serbs, yet the Europeans 
were not successful in ending violence until the U.S. got involved. The Dayton Peace 
Agreement of 1995 concluded the fight and sufferings of the people. U.S. efforts 
among the international community, especially U.S. Ambassador Richard 
Holbrooke’s efforts to provide peace between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
deserved special applause. Later in 1998, Holbrooke was there again with the 
intention of ending Serbian aggression towards Kosovo diplomatically. However, he 
and the Contact Group were not successful in stopping Milosevic. NATO, under the 
leadership of the U.S., initiated air strikes to end Serbian attacks and the Serbian 
dictator had to surrender in the aftermath. Peace in Kosovo came under the 
protection of KFOR, which was part of the Peace Enforcement, while IFOR 
(Implementation Force) and SFOR (Stabilization Force) brought peace to Kosovo.“’
■" Ahmet Davutoglu, Edit()r, CNN Türk, 17.02.2004.
İlhan Uzgel, “1990-2001: Küreselleşme Ekseninde Türkiye: ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler”, ed. 
Baskın Oran in Türk Dıs Politikası: Kurtuluş Savasından Bimüne Olunlar. Belueler. Yorumlar. 1980- 
2001. Vol. 2, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp. 274-75.
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In this new decade, it could be argued that tlic international community and 
especially the U.S. were more determined to protect peace in the world. After 
experiencing two World Wars and a larger period of Cold War, the international 
community did not want to lose the tranquility again with regional wars in the 
Balkans or any other area. Hence, with this notion in mind most of the nations 
including Turkey got involved in the process of ending war in the Balkans 
diplomatically, politically, or militarily. In this period, peace and stability were 
immediate demands of the international community, tired of wars.
Briefly, it could be argued that this post-Cold war decade brought together 
newly emerging opportunities and challenges to the international order. The political 
and economic opportunities of the Caucasus, Balkans, and Eastern Europe became 
important, while the European Union increased its strength as an economic challenge 
to the U.S. However, it was clearly understood that first of all, world politics had to 
be freed from the legacy of the Cold War. Hence, the immediate years of the post- 
Cold war became a period of preparation and transition in which new rules in 
international politics were taking shape. Every incident that occurred during the 
1990s had a crucial influence over the structure of the new world order since all the 
local or regional issues affected the whole world, which was steadily becoming 
smaller as a result of the technological developments stemming from globalization. 
Hence as a result of rapid global developments in the world, new actors arose in the 
post-cold war era with the strength to challenge the already existing powers because 
they gained economic, political or military power to have right to “speak louder”.
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2.4 A Decade of Rising Powers
At the very beginning of the decade, it could be argued that rivalry between the two 
camps ended with the triumph of capitalism over communism. It was explicitly seen 
that the race resulted in the collapse of communism, yet it also demonstrated to the 
world that the only benefit of this rivalry was technological innovations. Thus, after 
the Soviet demise the U.S. was more enthusiastic to benefit from the technological 
developments to accelerate its global power without a major rival. Nonetheless, when 
the U.S. started its search for global leadership, it had to face some other 
competitors, because while the U.S. and Soviet Union were struggling to expand 
their respective spheres of influence all over the world, these new competitors gained 
economic strength and developed their countries. Among these newly rising 
economic powers, Germany became prominent immediately at the very beginning of 
the decade, while the European Union and some of the Far Eastern countries were 
about to rise up as potential economic rivals.
The U.S. was aware of the fact that it should not lose the control of oil 
supplies in the world since Germany and Japan to some extent were economically 
strong to compete in the areas where there were large oil supplies. However, the 
U.S. knew that Germany and Japan were not the only competitors. Therefore, it had 
to preserve control over all the possible competitors both in Europe and the Far East 
to be able to continue with its global objectives. Hence, preserving its economic 
interests; having control over oil-rich regions such as Caucasus, Middle East, and 
Latin America; containing Russian influence in its “near abroad”; and protecting its 
allies and their interests related to its own interests were among the major U.S. global 
objectives.
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In the post-Cold war decade, the Wilsonian principles of idealism, which 
celebrated democracy, liberalism, peace and free trade, rccmcrgcd in the U.S. and it 
was argued that these principles started to influence U.S. foreign policy objectives. 
However, this time in the post-Cold War era, the U.S. as the sole superpower had 
taken more responsibilities so it had to formulate its foreign policy according to the 
credentials of the day. Some of the main U.S. global objectives as mentioned above 
could be recounted as follows: taking control over the main energy routes (the 
Middle East and Caucasus) to provide the free flow of oil from these regions to the 
world; preserving U.S. and its allies interests in the world; and preserving peace and 
stability in all regions where U.S. interests were at stake (the Balkans, Middle East, 
Caucasus and Central Asia) in order to be able to continue its superiority.
On the one side, while supporting EU integration, the U.S. had to be cautious 
about French intentions of gaining more power since France has been one of the 
major opponents of U.S. policies in the world. Additionally, the U.S. had to be 
always aware of the fact that a politically, economically and militarily stronger EU 
would be more interested in pursuing independent policies. On the other side, China 
is a rising East Asian country with its great economic and demographic potential.
After realizing the importance of the rising powers both in Europe and the Far 
East, the U.S. increased its focus on these regions in order not to lose influence over 
them. As a global power trying to augment its hegemony all over the world, the U.S. 
should not irritate or annoy them but it should gradually win them by increasing 
cooperation in different fields. In this respect the U.S. gave support to Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in order to strengthen economic cooperation and to
Hooshang Amirahmadi, p. 371.
This idea was stated by Seyfi Ta§han at the Foreign Policy Institute in Ankara in an interview on 
U.S.-Turkish Relations with the author o f the thesis. (14.04.2004.)
Burcu Bostanoglu, pp. 310-11.
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increase trade and investment among member countries. As a member of this forum, 
the U.S. enhanced its role and efficiency in important regional developments. 
Furthennore, being part of the fonim provided the U.S. tlie ability and strength to 
have full control over the issues.'^
On the other hand, as İlhan Uzgel has summarized, the Soviet demise did not 
really eliminate U.S. interest in the Russian Federation. On the contrary, the U.S. 
wanted to gain the Russian Federation by bringing it into the Western realm and by 
restructuring it according to the western values of democracy, human rights and 
liberal eeonomy. Thus the U.S. proposed cooperation to Russia in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. Other issues used by the U.S. to indicate that it really wanted to 
increase its hegemonic power could be counted as: making China part of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and forming North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
with the Latin American states to legitimate U.S. control over these countries. In 
addition to these efforts, the U.S. did not want to lose its superiority and leadership 
over the EU, Japan, or China so once more it decided to take a leading role in 
important conflicts in the world. In Europe, the U.S. intervened in the conflicts in 
Kosovo, in North Ireland, and in Turkish-Greek disputes; in Far East, the U.S. 
intervened in the conflict between North and South Korea, and in the Taiwan- China 
dispute, while in the Middle East the U.S. worked to establish peace in the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. Hence the significant part is that during the 1990s the U.S. and 
Turkey cooperated in the Balkans, Middle East, and Caucasus since Turkey was at 
the crossroads of these regions, which were very crucial for the U.S. and its global 
interests. Thus, it could be argued that the U.S. had established different networks
İlhan Uzgcl, “ABD vc NATO’yla İlişkiler (Relations with the U.S. and NATO)”, (ed.) Baskin Oran, 
Türk P is Politikası:...”, pp. 249-50.
2.S Ibid.
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of allies to make it easier to realize its foreign objectives. Turkey or Mexico, there 
was always an ally to help the U.S. confimi its superiority.
In conclusion, it was seen that throughout the 1990s the U.S. strived to 
establish its hegemony all over the world with different methods. It was not really 
easy for the U.S. to declare its hegemony since there were many economically strong 
powers. Hence it applied many successful ways to cope with all the,se new rivals 
such as Germany in EU, Japan and China in the Far East. Moreover, the U.S. knew 
the most convenient methods of coercing. Rather than antagonizing its rivals and 
fighting against them, the U.S. preferred to win them through alliances. Most of the 
potential antagonists sided with the U.S., since it was not reasonable to confront the 
major power in the world. Thus, the U.S. persuaded most of its potential rivals to 
play the game according to the rules of the sole superpower, which proposed 
liberalism, democracy, and globalization as the requirements of the new world order. 
Under these global conditions, Turkey had to find its place in world politics and 
formulate its foreign policy objectives.
2.5 Turkey at the Beginning of the New Decade
During the emerging post-Cold War era, Turkey initially had to reorient its national 
interests and security requirements in order to successfully meet significant new 
challenges including both opportunities to exploit and problems to solve. On the one 
hand, it was clear that Turkey had to expand its foreign policy horizons, as the end of 
the Cold War era changed Turkey’s “strategic environment and strategic agenda’’.*'^  
Nevertheless, on the other hand, it would not be incorrect to argue that it would be 
difficult for Turkey to adapt to the new conditions, since as Heinz Kramer and
F. Stephen Larrabee, “U.S. and European Poliey toward Turkey and the Caspian Basin”, in Allies 
Divided: Transatlantie Polieies for the Greater Middle East, (eds). Robert D. Blackwill &Michael 
Stunner. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 145.
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Friedemann Müller have stated, Turkey was unprepared to meet the outcomes of “a 
radically transformed international environment”.'^ *^ Nevertheless, Turkey was 
unprepared as any other country at the beginning of the decade, not less or much. 
Hence, this unprepared Turkey had to deal with many important issues at the same 
time in a region very important to U.S., even though its foreign policy was not ready 
to encounter them altogether.
While with the Gulf War Turkey had to deal with Iraq by getting into a 
Middle Eastern conflict after a very long time, with the Soviet dissolution and the 
emergence of the newly independent states (NIS) involved Ankara in the Caspian 
Basin and Central Asian affairs. And finally with the demise of Yugoslavia, Turkey 
became a crucial security element for Balkan stability, which was threatened by wars 
among the former Yugoslav republics immediately after they declared their 
independence.
Some of the main strategic opportunities that Turkey encountered at the very 
beginning of the post-Cold War era that were to affect its strategic position as a 
“pivotal state” or as a “model state” came one after another. First, the end of the Cold 
War brought an end to the Soviet threat. Nevertheless, this change in Turkish threat 
perceptions and security concerns did not really eliminate the threats Turkey might 
be exposed to, but only changed the direction of the probable hostile powers by 
bringing Iraq, Syria and even Iran into the picture.^' For the first time after many 
decades, the new Russian Federation did not directly pose an existential threat for the 
security of Turkey.^^ Although this did not end Turkish worries, increasing relations 
with the Russian Federation were more promising than with Iraq, Syria and Iran.
Heinz Kramer and Friedemann Müller, “Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries”, 
in Allies Divided: Transatlantie Polieies for the Greater Middle East, p. 180.
F. Stephen Larrabee, “U.S. and European Policy toward Turkey and the Caspian Basin”, pp. 145- 
46.
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Thus, Turkey concentrated more on countering any threat tliat might come I'roni its 
southern and eastern neighbors rather than from the Russian Federation.
Conflictual issues between Turkey and Syria, for instance, were Syrian 
support for the terrorist PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdcstan-Kiirdisli Workers Party) 
and water rights.^^ Turkey had to be more determined to end Syrian support of tlic 
Kurdish separatist movement if it wanted to get rid of the PKK problem and even use 
the water issue as an incentive to end Syrian support. However, Ankara could not 
play this card successfully against Syria until 1998, when a more assertive Turkish 
foreign policy toward Damascus resulted in Abdullah Öcalan’s (the PKK leader) 
expulsion from Syria. According to Alan Makovsky, Özal’s legacy of pursuing an 
activist Turkish foreign policy, which required it to be prepared to “use or to threaten 
to use force”, guided Ankara in the 1998 crisis with Syria. There were many reasons 
for Turkey’s newfound assertiveness; “more prosperity; a better-equipped and more 
experienced military; the decline of neighboring states; greater regional opportunity; 
and a greater sense of policy independence marked by the ending of restraints 
imposed by the Cold War.” '^'
On the other side, the emergence of Caspian and Central Asian countries 
with rich resources of oil and gas, created possible disputes between Turkey and Iran 
to increase their influence over these states. Thus, according to Graham Fuller, it was 
strongly possible that this rivalry might destroy their bilateral tics. However, Fuller 
disregarded the fact that Turkey and Iran have lived in peace and preserved their 
relations for centuries. There is a strong and long lasting state tradition between
Ibid, p. 146.
”  Graham E. Fuller, “Conclusions: The Growing Role ofTurkey in the World” in Turkey’s New 
Geopolitics From the Balkans to Western China, (cds.) Graham E Fuller & Ian Lesser, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1993, p. 166.
Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”, SA/S Review, (Winter-Spring 
1999), pp. 92-113.’
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Turkey and Iran and possibly they would not let the U.S. circumvent these bilateral 
relations. This would be seen in the Turkish initiative to make agreements with Iran 
on obtaining Iranian gas in 1996 despite U.S. disapproval. On the Iraqi side, the 
emergence of an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq threatened Turkey’s 
integrity since the Kurdish tribal leaderships in Iraq supported or at least remained 
indifferent towards PKK attacks on Turkey. Any increasing support might cause a 
real struggle for Turkey to preserve the unity of its territory.''^ The U.S. used the 
possibility of Iraqi Kurdish support for PKK as an idea to demonstrate to Ankara that 
Turkey needed U.S. support in the region and made sure that Ankara would not act 
independently.
Second, the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought new independent actors 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia; however, with primordial historical and cultural 
ties to Turkey. Turkey, according to RAND Corporation, appeared as a model for 
these states with its secular and democratic structure.^*’ Nonetheless, even though 
Turkey was very enthusiastic in embracing its long-lost relatives from the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, the Turkish governments in the early 1990s were not economically 
and politically powerful enough to establish meaningful relations with the “Turkic 
world”. Although Turkey was not ready to accommodate these states, it was well 
known that the natural resources of this newly independent region increased the 
geopolitical importance of Turkey as a country that might play a vital role in the 
transportation of oil and gas of the Caucasus in subsequent years. However, very 
soon the United States realized that Turkey was not well equipped to fulfill the 
requirements once the Soviet Union had, and to apply policies parallel to U.S. 
interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Furthermore, it was clear that these states
Graham E. Fuller, “Conclusions:. . .”, p. 166. 
Ibid, pp. 163-65.
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did not really want another country as a “big brother'' and they were not cntluisiaslic 
about ending their relations with the Russian Federation. This eonimon attitude of 
NIS disappointed Turkey and Turkey’s failure of establishing elo.ser relations with 
NIS frustrated the U.S., which aimed at increasing inllucnee in these countries 
through Turkey. It was seen that Russia would continue its political and economic 
relations with its “near abroad”. In short, Turkey had the political willingness but not 
the capability to respond to the demands of the Caucasian and Central Asian States. 
Turkish governments in the second half of the 1990s started to face Turkey’s 
potential realistically.
Thirdly, new horizons were opened in the Balkans for Turkey to merge as a 
militarily and politically powerful country after the collapse of the Communist 
regimes there. During the Cold War, relations between Turkey and the Balkan states 
were minimal because they were part of Communist East or non-aligned such as 
Yugoslavia and Albania, while Turkey sided with the capitalist West. However, 
Turkish Foreign Ministry envisaged a significant role for Turkey to play in the 
Balkans, where old regimes were collapsing and new states were being formed. 
Hence in such a complicated environment Turkey could not abstain from pursuing 
more active policies for the sake of preserving its historical tics with the Muslim as 
well as Christian populations in different states in the B alk an s .In  addition to the 
importance of historical ties, the Balkans was significant for Turkey because this area 
is an air and land corridor of Turkey to Europe. Hence peace and stability of the 
region would benefit all the parties as well as Turkey. Nonethele.ss, this activism in 
Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans annoyed the Greek government that was 
worried about being encircled by a “Muslim arc” and the increasing importance of
’’ Obraci Kcsic, “Amcrican-Tiirkish Relations at a Crossroads”, Mcililciranciin Quarterly, (Winter 
1995), pp. 97-108, on pp. 100-101.
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Turkey in the Balkans as a provider of security and peace. Hence this fear increased 
the level of the existing competition between Turkey atul Cireeee in the Aegean and 
Cyprus disputes during the I990s.^‘'
Fourth, at the beginning of the new era, Turkey had to face some problems in 
Europe, which did not really accept Turkey as part of the European architecture. The 
Europeans, after being liberated from the Soviet threat, began to talk about the 
different character of the Turkish state. Most of them believed that furkey did not 
really belong to the newly emerging security order in Europe and tried to alienate 
Turkey. Furthermore, by refusing the Turkish application for candidacy to the 
European Union while at the same time establishing relations with the Eastern 
European countries, the European Union disappointed the Turkish people, who were 
inclined to Western values long before the Eastern Europeans were. This was a clear 
sign that the Western European countries wanted to keep the EU and WEU structures 
confined to the “Christian club” members.·*' In the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, the 
EU explicitly demonstrated its reluctance to admit Turkey as a candidate, though 
Turkey could become a security provider for the EU members with its powerful army 
and experience in NATO. Hence from the Turkish perspective this rejection was 
connected to being a Muslim country since there was not another valid reason for the 
alienation of Turkey from EU in general and from WEU in particular, when Europe 
was taking much more concrete decisions about formulating Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) of the union. The EU members must have been aware that 
the associate member status in WEU would not really meet the needs and
Graham E. Fuller, “Conclusions:...”, p. 165.
’’ Ibid and F. Stephen Larrabec. “U.S. and F.uropean....”, pp. 146-47.
F. Stephen Larrabcc, “U.S and European... , p. 147.
■*' Graham E. Fuller, “Conclusions;...", p. 167.
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expectations of Turkey, which aimed at being a full member of all European 
structures.
Finally, Turkey had to counter the threat posed by neighboring countries 
possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). During the Gulf War, it was seen 
clearly that Turkish lands were vulnerable to Iraqi missiles since the Iraqis had 
launched missiles at Israel. Thus, after the Gulf War Turkey had to be very 
cautious in its relations with Iraq in order to avoid any unwanted attack from its 
neighbor. Furthermore, to be prepared for any missile attack, Turkey also increased 
military cooperation with Israel. Thus, this cooperation would deter not only Iraq but 
also Syria, since with the military cooperation agreement between Israel and Turkey 
in 1996; Turkey gained access to the advanced military technology of Israeli arms 
industry and also had some hopes for Israeli lobbying in the U.S. on behalf of 
Turkey.^^
Within the context of being part of the European security architecture and 
avoiding threats from WMD, the continuation and enlargement of NATO became 
crucial milestones in Turkish foreign policy at the very beginning of the post-Cold 
war era. Turkey supported the U.S. stand of transforming NATO into a larger 
collective security alliance Subsequently, Turkey by trying to bring peace and 
stability to the Balkans and even to the continent, continued its backing of NATO. 
The UN failure to end Serbian crimes in former Yugoslavia increased Turkey’s 
expectation that NATO could provide “the new instruments for peace-keeping”. 
Nevertheless, the issue of NATO expansion, coming after establishing cooperation 
with the former Warsaw Pact countries and the former republics of Soviet Union
F. Stephen Larrabee, “U.S. and European...’’, p. 147. 
Ibid, pp. 147-48.
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through Partnership for Peace (PfP), caused anxiety for Turkey. Ankara botli feared 
losing its significance in the alliance and annoying the Russian Federation, which 
had some real reservations about the enlargement of NATO.' '^^
On the other side, Turkey had reservations about whether the new role of 
NATO would cover all the relevant threat perceptions of Turkey. Turkey was 
anxious about the issue since it did not want to lose its significance in an enlarged 
alliance. Additionally, Turkey demanded that expansion should be made in stages 
and should not be directed against any third country, especially the Russian 
Federation."*^ From the Turkish perspective, it was vitally significant to preserve 
good relations with the Russian Federation in order to live in peace in the 
neighboring regions, which were still under Russian sphere of influence.
Officially, this issue of enlargement implicating the Russian Federation did not steer 
Turkey away from the U.S. since the U.S. had already been interested in bringing the 
Russian Federation into all Western structures.
While Turkey was facing these issues, it also had to deal with domestic 
hardships. Economic losses resulting from the closure of Yumurtalık Oil Pipeline in 
1990 and the end of trade relations with Iraq brought unbearable domestic hardships 
to Turkish governments. The ANAP (Motherland Party) paid the price of entering 
into alliance with the U.S. in the Gulf War without receiving compensation by losing 
the general elections. The new coalition government under Süleyman Dcmircl’s DYP 
(True Path Party) and Erdal İnönü’s SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) had to 
strive for an economically and politically powerful Turkey. Nevertheless, these
For a detailed work on NATO’s changing character from collective defense to collective security 
sec Gulnur Aybet, NATO's Devdoninu Role in Collective Security, (Ankara: SAM Papers 4/99, 
1999).
‘ Ali Karaosmanoglu, “NATO Enlargement and the South: A 1 urkish Perspective’’, Security 
Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 2, (June 1999), pp. 2 13-224 and Strobe Talbott, Why NA TO SliouUI Grow,
htto://vvww.nvbooks.com/articlcs/1H26
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traditional mainstream parties’ inability to end the social and economic problems of 
the country led the pro-lslamist party of Necmettin Erbakan, Rcfah (Welfare Party), 
to come to power as a coalition partner with DYP in 1996.·*^  Such a change in 
political orientation increased fear both at home and abroad, especially in the U.S. 
Nevertheless, despite some disturbing applications of Prime Minister Erbakan, he 
had to follow the mainstream Turkish foreign policy most of the time.^ **
In conclusion, it could be argued that at the very beginning of the new decade 
after the end of the Cold War, Turkey faced new opportunities; however, it was not 
really prepared to encounter such revolutionary changes economically, socially and 
politically. Turkey’s exposure to new horizons altogether immediately after the 
collapse of the bipolar world left it frustrated. Ankara could not easily formulate its 
foreign policy objectives according to its priorities and national interests, but was 
dragged into different directions. Moreover, the lack of certain and concrete foreign 
objectives caused serious damage to Turkish interests in neighboring regions such as 
the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. Rather than being involved in almost all 
regional conflicts, Ankara had to pick the most significant issues and apply its policy 
accordingly. Neither U.S. interests nor the Western European interests benefited 
Turkey; thus, it had to take into account only its national interests before formulating 
its foreign objectives if it really wanted to become a pivotal state, in order to balance 
its relations with Washington in the post-Cold war era. Therefore, it is significant to 
analyze what major incidents determined the nature of U.S.-Turkish relations in this 
era before drawing conclusions on the relationship between Turkey and the U.S.
Nasuh Uslu, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri. (Ankara: 21.Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000), p. 384.
F. Stephen Larrabee, “U.S. and European...’’, p. 149.
For detailed analyses on the Erbakan government and its foreign and domestic policy applications 
between 1996-1997 see Gencer Özcan, (ed.), Onbir Aylık Saltanat: Siyaset Ekonomi vc Dıs Politikada 
Refahvol Dönemi (Elcven-Monlh Sultanate: Welfare and True Path Coalition Period in Politics. 
Economics and Foreign Policy). (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1998).
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CHAPTERS
REDEFINING U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS
3.1 The Main Characteristics of the Relationship between II.S. and Turkey
Although relations between Americans and Turks go back to the 19"’ century 
Ottoman times and continued in the 20"' century, the closest relationship only 
emerged after World War 11 with the bipolar division of the world. Subsequently, the 
most significant development that increased the strategic nature of the relationship 
between Turkey and the U.S. was Turkey’s membership in NATO. Beside traditional 
threats resulting from Soviet demands. Westernization of Turkish institutions 
required Turkey to become an ally of NATO. Turkey interpreted this choice as a 
question of identity and decided its place in the bipolar world by siding with the 
Western camp, especially by taking into consideration USSR’s demands of 
renegotiating the Montreaux Convention for larger rights vis-à-vis the Turkish straits 
and demanding Kars and Ardahan indirectly through Georgia. Hcncc these demands 
distanced Turkey from the USSR and brought it closer to the Western camp.'*"
Turkey wanted to be an equal partner of the Western alliance, and NATO 
became its option. After NATO accepted Turkey as a member in 1952, relations 
between Turkey and the U.S. developed in many areas despite many “ups and
Turkey’s options were not limited only with the Western camp or choosing the Soviet bloc. The 
other option Turkey had was non-alignment as the Third world chose. Turkey also could deter the 
Soviet threat by remaining neutral, however Turkey insisted on NATO membership since it was a 
matter o f identification with the West and being under the Western security arrangements.
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downs” in their bilateral ties at different times.*'’ Nonetheless, the closeness of U.S.- 
Turkish relationship, which would continue its innucncc during the 1990s, began 
especially after the two states signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (DEÇA) in 1980. The revolution in Iran and USSR’s occupation of 
Afghanistan in 1979 directly affected U.S. interests in the region. With this 
agreement, which was renewed every year, the U.S. tied Turkey to its own interests 
and, despite some Turkish requests for revision''', the agreement continued 
unchanged. Renewal of the revised agreement would have indicated that the U.S. 
did not want to lose Turkey in the post-Cold War era, in a period in which the 
significance of Turkey would increase. However, by not revising the agreement, as 
Ankara requested, it may be argued that the U.S. declared its power and superiority 
as a superpower over Turkey at the very beginning of the decade.
Other primary elements that determined the character and the structure of 
post-Cold War Turkish-American relations were continuity and change in Turkish 
foreign policy. Hence in the post-Cold War period, it was seen that Turkey continued 
its strategic and political cooperation with the U.S. both by continuing its bilateral
In International Relations literature there are many sources dealing with the Cold War relations 
between Turkey and the U.S. They point out in detail to times of convergence and divergence in 
bilateral tics. The main origins o f a strategic partnership started with the Truman Doctrine o f 1947 and 
followed with Marshall Plan of 1948 and NATO membership. On the other side, the major issues that 
damaged the trust between these two states were counted as follows: Jupiter missile crisis o f 1962, 
Johnson Letter o f 1964, and U.S. embargo of 1975-1978. For details see Ferenc A. Vali, Bridue 
Across the Bosporus: The Forciun Policy of Turkey, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1971); George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-Amcrican Problems in Historical Perspective. 
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972) & TURKEY: Copitm with Crisis. (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1985); Nasuh Uslu, Tiirk-Amerikan İlişkileri (Turkish-Amcrican Relations).
(Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınlan, 2000); and Baskın Oran (cd.), Türk Dis Politikası: Kurtuluş 
Savasından Bugüne Olgular. BclücIcr. Yorumlar, (İstanbul: İlcti: i^m Yayınları, 2001).
Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Turkish Perspectives...’’, pp. 345-47. The basic changes 'fıırkcy wanted in the 
agreement were: Turkey wanted U.S. garantcc for its security and that the U.S. should provide it with 
military equipment. It also requested U.S. support in developing its defense industry by increasing the 
transfer o f military technology. Moreover, Turkey demanded political support for its light against 
terrorism and its aggressive neighbors such as Syria and Iraq, hinally, 'fiirkcy requested that 
Operation Provide Comfort 2 be incooperated into the DEÇA by bringing new regulations for the 
usage o f the Turkish air bases in non-NATO operations.
İlhan Uzgcl, “ABD vc NATO’yla İlişkiler’’, pp. 283-84.
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relations and its NATO membership. In addition to this, Turkish-Amcrican relations 
continued over issues such as the Cyprus problem, economic and military assistance, 
U.S. approach to the Kurdish problem, and developments in northern Iraq. In the 
post-CoId War period there emerged other areas of cooperation between Turkey and 
the U.S. The new areas of cooperation were Europe-Balkans, Caucasus-Central Asia, 
and the Middle East. In this period Turkey always took into consideration that the 
U.S. as the single superpower was too important to ignore. Finally, in this period, 
U.S. insistence on democracy and human rights determined the character of Turkish- 
American relations.^^
During the 1990s, the U.S.-Turkish strategic relationship (to some, even, a 
partnership) flourished especially after Turkey’s contribution to the Gulf War in 
terms of opening its bases to the coalition powers and participation in the economic 
sanctions against Iraq. Hence as an outcome of this support, the U.S. administration 
promoted Turkey’s role in Central Asia and Balkans. U.S. support for Turkey was 
especially pronounced on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ccyhan pipeline, which was not 
economically feasible according to some. Therefore, it could be argued that the U.S. 
could not really afford to lose Turkey.
Turkey as a NATO ally preserves its significance in the alliance not only 
because of its geopolitical location but also because of its military potential in this 
specific period when NATO enlargement is on U.S. agenda. Additionally, even in its 
bilateral relations with the U.S., Turkey usually served best for American interests in 
its own region and in its neighborhood since Ankara sided with the Western bloc and 
especially because U.S. interests did not really challenge Turkish national interests. 
Moreover, it could be debated that there is a reciprocal necessity between Turkey and
”  ilhan Uzgcl, “ABD vc NATO’yla lliskilcr", pp. 24.1-44.
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the U.S. that tics them very closely to cacli otiicr. Neither Tiirkev. despite some 
opposition to U.S. policies, nor the U.S., in spite of luiman rights and tiemocraey 
concerns on Turkey, could easily give up the strategic relationship.
Especially, now, in the 2U' century, there are more common policies and 
interests toward the stability and peace in the Balkans, in Caucasus aiul Central Asia, 
and Middle East that bring the U.S. and Turkey together. “Energy Security, the 
threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ‘congaging’ Ru.ssia, deepening 
Turkey’s integration in the West” seemed to become the primary concerns of the 
Western alliance in general and the U.S. in particular.^"  ^ Although the.se issues are 
also very crucial for Turkey, the priorities of the Turkish Republic arc not exactly the 
same with its Western allies. For Turkey, the security of energy routes is important, 
yet EU membership is more significant. Furthermore, Ankara is concerned with the 
issue of WMD; however there is no clear threat posed to Turkey by its neighbors. 
Nevertheless, all these different points of view did not change the main issue that 
there are common interests between the U.S. and Turkey, and their relationship 
necessitates a special study.
3.2 Fundamental Characteristics of a Strategic Partnership
In order to make meaningful analyses and to come to more concrete conclusions as 
how to define the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey, it is vitally necessary to 
define and analyze the concept of partnership. The dictionary dellnition of 
partnership is “a business which has more than one owner but is not incorporated, the 
individual partners remaining fully responsible for its debts’’.“^ The recpiircmcnts of a 
partnership are: “partners need not all be equal: in professional partnership it is
' Zalmay Klialilzad, “Л Strategic Plan for Wostcm-'l'urkish Relations", pp.79-96.
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common for senior partners to get a larger share of tlic rewards and do a smaller 
share of the routine work than junior partners.”'^ ’
According to Seyfi Taşhan, Director of the Foreign Policy Institute in 
Ankara, this definition of a partnership describes the “senior brother, junior brother” 
(Ağabey, küçük kardeş) relationship^^ between the U.S. and Turkey well. 
Nevertheless, debate arises when we accept Turkey as a strategic partner of the U.S. 
at a level equivalent to those of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Israel. The 
concept of Turkey’s strategic partnership with the U.S. is not similar to the 
relationship between the U.S. and UK, Canada, or Israel. If it is accepted that UK, 
Israel and Canada are strategic partners of the U.S.^ **, there should be a clear 
delineation of the U.S.-Turkish partnership. Friction arose because neither the U.S. 
nor Turkey has clearly defined what strategic partnership means in their respective
59contexts.
“Partnership” in U.S.-Turkish relations refers only to the closeness of these 
states so “strategic partnership” points to the “military closeness” of one another.^’” 
Similar to Seyfi Taşhan’s description. Şükrü Elekdağ also points to strategic 
partnership as “special importance Washington is attributing to another country and 
the privileged allied relations it maintains with that country.” ’^' According to 
Elekdağ, a strategic partnership should cover cooperation in all fields, and each 
partner should fulfill its obligations and should sustain the interests of the other. 
When looked at it from this point of view, it is hard to accept that there is an exact
”  John Black, Oxford Dictionary of Economics. (Oxford: Oxford Univcrsiiy Press, 1997), p. .14.1. 
Ibid.
Seyfi Taşhan, Author’s interview on 14.04.2004.
Şükrü Elekdağ, Turkish Press Review, www.hri.org/news/turkey/trkpr/2002/02-01- 
07.trkpr.html.
Yalım Eralp, “An Insider’s View of Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Its American Connection’’, in 
Morton Abram'owitz, (cd.) The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need, (New York: The Century 
Foundation Press, 2003), p. 118.
Seyfi Taşhan, interview on 14.04.2004.
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resemblance between the U.S.-Turkish “partnership” and U.S.-UK or Israel 
partnership.
The basic elements of the strategic partnership between the U.S. and the UK, 
Israel, Canada are human, ethnic, social and historical ties“ ‘^ as well as common 
interests, while the U.S.-Turkish partnership depends only on “common interests, 
protection by the U.S. of Turkey’s interests in return for the protection by Turkey of 
the interests of the U.S.”*’"^ Therefore, the strategic relationship between Turkey and 
U.S. will remain only as long as common interests arc shared, that is, there will 
always be a question mark about what if common interests di.sappcar. Most probably 
the answer to this question and many similar ones may easily point that the U.S.- 
Turkish relations are based on reciprocal interests unlike the relations with the UK, 
Israel, or Canada in which the second pillar, that of human, ethnic, social and 
historical ties are as significant as the common interests. Hence, the continuation of 
the partnership between the U.S. and Turkey is directly related to the continuation of 
common interests.
Moreover, Seyfi Taşhan has put forward that the concept of partnership 
between the U.S. and Turkey is “only an empty rhetoric” (boş bir ifade), nothing 
more than a popular term used by the U.S. to describe cooperation and friendly 
relations between the two states.^’'' However, the notion of strategic relationship, 
despite the lack of any official agreement made by the U.S. and Turkey, became a 
widely used term in describing U.S.-Turkish relations during the last decade of the
Şükrü Elckdağ, Sahalı, Turkish Press Review.
“  Ibid.
“  Eyüp Can, “The Current Slate o f Turkish-U.S. Relations”, Zaman Online,
www.zaman.conVinclude/yazdir.phb.^bl^columnistiktrh—20040329&hn—...
^  Seyfi Taşhan, interview on 14.04.2004.
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20 century, [the strategic partnership] has continued to characterize lire nature of 
Turkish-U.S. relations, even if it was only a matter of words.“'''
Nevertheless, even if Turkey is not as equal as UK, Israel, or Canada to the 
U.S. in terms of its strategic importance, it is a well-known fact that the U.S. usually 
used the term “strategic partner” when referring to its relations with Turkey. Many 
leading officials like Strobe Talbott, Richard Holbrooke, and Marc Grossman 
emphasized Turkey’s importance and Washington strongly promoted the idea that 
Turkey was among “ markets deserving U.S. investment.”'’'’ Furthermore, the 
increasing Turkish role as a country at the crossroads of regions directly related to 
U.S. interests, and Washington’s backing of Turkey’s significance, were elevated to 
the presidential level. In 1999, when President Bill Clinton visited Turkey and spoke 
in the parliament, he once more put forward the strategic importance U.S. attributed 
to Turkey when he referred to Turkey as “a strategic partner”.'’’
In conclusion, it could be stated that whether it is labeled as a strategic 
relationship or as a strategic partnership, it is clear that during the 1990s U.S.- 
Turkish relations continued in different areas. The most crucial part is that Turkey 
and the U.S. continued their relationship and even increased their cooperation in 
many new regions where their interests overlapped while Turkey fulfilled the 
obligations of partnership. Hence, even though Turkey did not reach and most 
probably will not reach the level of UK or Israel in terms of its relations with the 
U.S. based on common ethnicity or historical solidarity, it was clear that the U.S. 
could not neglect its relations with Turkey. On the contrary, bilateral tics increased as
Eyüp Can, “The Current State...”, Zaman Online.
“  Kemal Kirişçi, “U.S.-Turkisli Relations: New Uncertainties in a Renewed I’arineistiip" in Barry 
Rubin & Kemal Kirişçi (cds.), Turkey in World Politics: An EmerKİn.ı-.MullirçKİonal Power,
(Boulder: Lynne Ricnncr Publishers, 2001), p. 1.^ 4.
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a result of Turkey emerging as a multidimensional regional power. It will be useful 
to look at U.S. Turkish areas of convergence and divergence concerning tlic regional 
developments in order to make concrete analyses of what major points characterized 
U.S.-Turkish relations in the last decade of the 20"' century.
3.3 Areas of Cooperation in U.S.-Turkish Relations
3.3.1 Bosnia
With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, both the U.S. and Turkey supported the idea 
of preserving the integrity of the state since these two countries were anxious about 
the stability and order of the region. Nevertheless, disintegration continued and the 
following ethno-nationalistic conflicts in Bosnia demonstrated that the former 
Yugoslav republics could not get along with each other peacefully. Moreover, 
Serbian aggression increased to the level of atrocities that neither Turkey nor the 
U.S. could ignore after seeing the insufficiency of European countries in dealing with 
this “European conflict”.
From the very beginning, Turkey demanded that Western countries should 
use adequate force to stop Serbian aggression toward Bosnia, yet France and Britain 
did not share the same policy toward Serbia, ignoring Milosevic in the beginning.^’* 
Ankara, alarmed by increasing Serbian atrocities, promoted the idea of military 
intervention by NATO and demanded that sanctions should be applied against 
Belgrade.''^ Seeing that the Bosnian crisis had turned into a civilian massacre because 
o f the ineffective EU and UN policies, the U.S. realized that it needed to take
focused on the fact that President Clinton referred to Turkey as a strategic partner in liis spcccli made 
in front o f  the representatives in the Turkish parliament.
“  İlhan Uzgel “Doksanlarda Türkiye İçin Bir İşbirliği ve Rekabet Alanı Olarak Balkanlar (Balkans as 
an Area o f  Cooperation and Competition for Turkey during the 1990s)”, in En Uzun Onyil: 
Türkiye’nin Ulnsal C.iivenlik ve Pis Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı. YilJarLTh_e_Longest Decade: 
1990s on Turk«-v’s National Seenritv and Foreign Policy Agenda), (eds.) Gcnccr Özcan & Şule Kut, 
(Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1998), p. 410.
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responsibility on the issue. Relying on the claims that this Balkan dispute was 
threatening the new order the U.S. wished to create, and that the U.S. was interested 
in the stability of the Balkans and Europe, Washington took initiative. Thus, in 
such an atmosphere of common interests and policies, there emerged cooperation 
between Turkey and the U.S. over Bosnia.
Guided by the primary concern of ending the war immediately, Turkey 
started to follow an activist foreign policy toward Bosnia and supported ail U.S. 
military and diplomatic initiatives to end the Serbian aggression. Turkey’s historical 
ties with the Bosniaks and humanitarian concern overlapped with the new world 
order anxiety and humanitarian concern by the U.S. over Bosnia. Thus U.S. efforts to 
stop Serbian aggression succeeded with the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995, in which 
Richard Holbrooke played the most crucial role. Later, the U.S. supported Turkey’s 
involvement in the multilateral peacekeeping operations, and their cooperation 
continued in the following periods. Turkey actively participated in Implementation 
Force (IFOR), after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, and even sent help to 
Bosnian-Croat Federation to train a new military force in this country beside the 
U.S.^' since Turkey was also a key actor in the establishment of this federation. The 
most significant point was that this U.S.-Turkish cooperation would try to bring 
stability and order to all Balkan states, including Kosovo.
3.3.2 Kosovo
U.S.-Turkish cooperation on Bosnia-Herzegovina continued in the conflict between 
Kosovar Albanians and Serbs that turned into an armed conflict in 1998. Serbian 
aggression once again emerged only three years after the Dayton Peace Accord, and
69Sabri Sayan, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era”, p. 177. 
İlhan Uzgcl, “Doksanlarda Türkiye...”, pp. 409-10.
Sabri Sayan, “Turkish Foreign Policy...”, pp. 176-78.
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this time Kosovar Albanians suffered Serbian atroeities. As in the Bosnian case. 
Turkey followed a policy of multilateral activism in Kosovo because it was 
concerned about regional stability and order of the Balkans. However, unlike in 
Bosnia, Turkey did not only get involved in the conflict diplomatically. Ankara as an 
ally of NATO strongly supported NATO’s air campaign against the Serbs and 
applied military and economic sanctions against Serbia.’*
The U.S. in the beginning of the decade had seen that Kosovo might become 
a potential dispute, and when the fight in Kosovo emerged, the U.S. did not hesitate 
to intervene and immediately started diplomatic initiatives over Kosovo in May 1998 
with the mediation efforts of Richard Holbrooke.’  ^Nevertheless, despite the U.S. and 
the Contact Group’ s efforts to stop Milosevic, diplomacy did not bring any solution. 
This diplomatic failure necessitated escalation to NATO’s air attacks against the 
Serbian military arsenal. At the end, Milosevic was compelled to surrender.
The main difference in Turkish foreign policy regarding Kosovo was that 
Turkey was not as free as it had been in Bosnia. Because of domestic concerns, 
Turkey could not really support the idea of an independent Kosovo while it was 
facing a similar situation with its Kurdish population. On the other side, though 
Turkey supported the idea that Kosovar Albanians should preserve their 
Constitutional rights, for regional concern, it had to think about the stability of the 
Balkans. Hence, Turkey had to take into consideration the notion of pre.serving the 
territorial integrity of Serbia rather than supporting the independence of Kosovo as a 
country.
Furthermore, Ankara evaluated the Kosovar issue in terms of its own 
sensitivity to the issue o f  territorial integrity, as it had shown in the Iraqi ease sinec
Sayan, p. 178.
”  Uzgel, “Doksanlarda Türkiye...’’, p. 421.
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the Gulf War of 1991. Thus, Turkey moved together with the U.S. and the 
international community in condemning the Serbs. Turkey played an important role 
in peacekeeping operations by taking part in multilateral post-conflict initiatives. The 
peaceful contribution of Turkey continued with Kosovo Force (KFOR) that aimed to 
provide order and stability for Kosovar Albanians under the guidance of United 
Nations.
In conclusion, it was important to see that Turkey and U.S. had cooperated in 
the Balkans. The main concern on Balkan security brought together Turkey, as a 
regional power, and the U.S. as a global power, to “fight” against a common threat, 
the Serbs. Although the cooperation in the Balkans was in multilateral frameworks, it 
could be claimed that this cooperation contributed to enhance the relationship 
between the U.S. and Turkey. Bosnia and Kosovo cases demonstrated that Turkey 
and the U.S. could continue to cooperate in different areas since they usually share 
common humanitarian concerns, and they have overlapping interests. Nonetheless, 
Turkey and the U.S. did not always prefer the same methods when they came across 
problems. Although they had common objectives, there were areas where they 
confronted each other. Especially in the Middle East, Turkey and the U.S. had 
different preferences in dealing with Iraq, Iran, and Syria, despite the fact that 
Washington had described them as rogue states.
3.4 Common Objectives but Different Methods
3.4.1 Iraq
In the post-Cold War era, the Persian Gulf Crisis, which emerged in August 1990 
when Iraq invaded Kuwait, was one of the main areas that the U.S. and Turkey had 
to face in the Middle East. This crisis would have various implications for Turkey 
and its role in the Middle East in the following years. It brought another dimension to
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post Cold War U.S.-Turkish relations and also changed the decades-old I'lirkish 
foreign policy of non-interference in the Middle East unless its vital national interests 
were at stake. With this crisis and the war following it, Turkey got involved in a 
Middle Eastern dispute by supporting the Coalition powers, which aimed to repel 
Saddam Hussein. Secondly, Turkey, by cooperating with the West, pointed out that it 
cared about the security interests of the Arab states.’“’ Hence, this shift from non­
interference to a pro-active stance in Middle Eastern problems in Turkish foreign 
policy would guide Ankara’s decisions in the following years not only with Iraq but 
also with Iran and Syria.
For President Turgut Özal, the Gulf crisis was a fortuitous event for Turkey 
to underscore its continuing significance for the Western alliance in terms of being 
able to deter regional conflicts and instability in the Middle East. The Western 
countries were aware of the fact that they needed Turkey on their side if they wanted 
to be successful with the embargo applied against Iraq.’  ^ Seeing this, Özal took 
advantage of the opportunity. On August 8, 1990 the Turkish government under the 
influence of the president, closed the Kirkuk-Yumurtahk pipeline first, and later it 
allowed the coalition powers to use İncirlik airbase under the obligations of NATO 
alliance despite domestic opposition. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Dozer’s 
resignation on October II was followed by the resignation of General Necip 
Torumtay, the Chief of the General Staff, on December 3, 1990.’'’ Thc.se resignations 
came as a protest of Özal’s policy of furthering Turkey’s military involvement in the 
Gulf War. Political support given to the coalition powers by allowing them to use
James Brown, “Turkey and the Persian Gulf Crisis", Medileiraiwan Quarkrly, (Spring 1991 ). pp. 
46-54, p. 46.
”  William Hale, “Turkey, the Middle East and the GulfCrisis”, Intenuiiiomil Affairs. Vol. 68, No. 4. 
(1992), pp. 679-692, pp. 683-84.
William Hale, pp. 684-86.
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incirlik base and economic support of applying embargo against Iraq were deemed 
quite sufficient by the civilian-military elite.”
Thus, both Ankara and Washington were close to each other since they cared 
about peace and stability in the region, and both wanted Saddam Hus.scin to fulfill 
the UN Security Council resolutions. However, it could not be claimed that there was 
a total overlap between the policies of Turkey and the U.S. Despite the common 
objectives, the U.S. and Turkish motivations towards policies on Iraq in particular 
and Middle East in general were different. From the U.S. perspective, the security of 
the Gulf region was significant in order to preserve the free flow of Gulf oil to the 
industrialized West, and a regime change in the Gulf would incrca.se the chance of 
Arab-Israeli peace by reducing extremism, terrorism, and weapons of mass 
destruction.’  ^Therefore, after the Gulf War, the U.S. acted in accordance with thc.se 
foreign policy objectives and its primary motivation became ousting Saddam 
Hussein. It seemed that ideas like the dissolution of Iraq and creation of an 
independent Kurdish state within the lands of Iraq did not bother the U.S. as it did 
Turkey. Despite Alan Makovsky’s statement that the U.S. “advocates the 
maintenance of Iraq’s territorial integrity’’” , it became a contentious issue that the 
U.S. overlooked the autonomous movements of Iraqi Kurds that might lead to the 
dissolution of Iraq resulting in an independent Kurdistan, an unacceptable idea for 
Turkey.
On the other side, Turkey was apprehensive about the idea of an independent 
Kurdish state in Iraq because this was believed to increase the terrorist activities of
”  Necip Torumtay, DcL'iscn Stralciilcrin Oclaüııula Türkiye (Turkey al Ihc rociis ol Cliaiiuinu 
StratcGics). (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1996), pp. 45-60. Гог details of the resignations and the 
opposition to Özal’s policy on Iraq sec also Necip Torumtay, Orgeneral Toriimtay’in Anilan(General 
Torumtav’s Memories). (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınlan, 1994).
Zbigniew Brzczinski, Brent Scowerofi, and Richard Murphy, “Differentiated Containment”, 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 3, (May/June 1997), pp. 20-30, p. 20.
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РКК, which was mainly trained in Iraq, Iran and Syria. Hence, the primar>' Turki.sh 
policy toward Iraq was guided by Turkish concerns on preventing an independent 
Kurdish state (despite the de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq), the expulsion of 
PKK camps and terrorists from the region, and restarting trade with Iraq.^" Hence, 
when looked at the Iraqi issue from the Turkish perspective, it could be argued that 
ousting Saddam Hussein was not the best solution. Although he was ruling his 
country as a dictator, he was also the protector of Iraqi integrity by not allowing an 
independent Kurdish entity. Thus for Turkey, most probably making Saddam 
Hussein obey UNSC resolutions and democratize Iraq would be better solutions 
rather than ousting him.
Nevertheless, the economic hardships Turkey faced after the war by ending 
trade with its second-largest trade partner in the Middle East, Iraq, increased 
Turkey’s economic problems. Turkey applied the UN embargo against Iraq although 
it had a very devastating effect on the Turkish economy. Alan Makovsky admitted 
that Turkey suffered the largest economic loss resulting from the Iraqi sanctions. 
Subsequently, he argued that the U.S. should compensate the Turkish economic 
loss.^' When looked at from the Turkish point of view, there was a great dilemma for 
Turkey since, on the one side, Ankara envisaged to cooperate with U.S. and UN 
policies on the embargo, but ignored its own economic interests. On the other side,
challenging the UN embargo and restarting relations with Iraq would mean direct
82opposition to UN and especially to the U.S.
Makovsky, “U.S. Policy Toward Turkey... , p. 2.10.
Ibid.
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The most confrontational and problematic issue between tlie U.S. and Turkey, 
which reemerged m Iraq, was the autonomous Kurdish population in northern Iraq. 
The no-fly zone established between the Turkish border and the area north of the 36"' 
parallel after the Gulf War to protect the civilians in the region from Saddam Hussein 
turned out to be a de facto Kurdish state that was perceived as a threat for Turkey’s 
integrity because of the “domino effect” it might have on its territory.* '^ Hence 
although Turkey shared the U.S. ideas of democracy and equality for Iraqi people, 
Ankara could not support the independence of a potential Kurdish state. Contrary to 
this, Turkey stated its support for the territorial and political integrity of Iraq even at 
the expense of seeing Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq. Nonetheless, Washington 
had already decided to oust Saddam Hussein as soon as possible, and it seemed that 
Washington would not allow Saddam Hussein any opportunity to establish relatively 
better relations with the Kurds. This meant that, unlike Ankara, Washington would 
support an autonomous Kurdish state or a special status for the Kurds in Iraq for the 
sake of getting rid of Saddam Hussein.*'*
In conclusion, it could be argued that the significance of the Middle East in 
general and Iraq in particular for U.S.-Turkish relations resulted from current 
problems. With the end of the Cold war, the agenda of Western and especially U.S.- 
Turkish relations were shaped according to heightened concerns over energy 
security, proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, 
containing and engaging Russia, and Turkish integration to the EU. Thus, Iraq, at 
the very center of the U.S-Turkish relations, increased its value both for Turkey and
83 Ibid, p. 352. , ,
Makovsky, “U.S. Policy...”, p. 231. This issue will be di.scusscd in detail in the lollowing pages oi
the thesis separately as a major Turkish reservation about U.S. policies in the Middle liast.
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the U.S. On the other hand, similar problems arose between Turkey and the U.S. 
because of Iran.
3.4.2 Iran
Starting with the revolution in Iran in 1979, relations between Iran and its neighbors 
changed since Iran constitutionally declared its intention to export the Islamic 
revolution to its neighborhood. On the other side, Iran as an Islamic Republic with 
rich natural resources became a source of conflict for the region by trying to develop 
ballistic missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC) programs. 
Such Iranian initiatives annoyed not only its neighbors but also the Western world 
and especially the U.S., because Iran with its political regime and military arsenal 
became a probable threat to the stability of the region. Hence the U.S. worried about 
preserving its interests in the Middle East, tried to convince Turkey and the other 
countries in the region to impose an embargo against Iran.
Turkey, as a neighbor of Iran, suffered from certain Iranian policies. Iranian 
support for the fundamentalist movements in Turkey threatened its political integrity 
and stability. Iranian efforts to obtain nuclear technology increased the vulnerability 
of Turkey in the event of a dispute between Turkey and Iran.**^ ’ Nevertheless, there 
was not a clear indication that Turkey was a target of Iranian military arsenal despite 
the fact the U.S. wanted to depict Iran as “an ideological rival and threat”'*’ for 
Turkey.®  ^For a Turkey that was already suffering from the sanctions applied on Iraq, 
Iran was too crucial a country to “pursue a policy of confrontation”. This was not 
only because of Turkey’s economic interests and historically cordial relations, but
** Aykan, “Turkish Perspectives...”, p. 353. 
Makovsky, “U.S. Policy...”, p. 233.
“  Ankara did not need the direction o f the U.S. to recognize the threat posed by Iran. However, the 
major Turkish concern about Iranian threat was not about increased nuclear technology but religious
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also because dialogue and cooperation through diplomatic means could work in the 
Iranian case to make it confonn to international rules on proliferation of micleii
89weapons.
Moreover, Turkey, despite the general U.S. request to isolate Iran tlirough 
economic sanctions, opposed this policy and continued its relations with Iran. It was 
clear that Turkey could not compensate “the loss of S250 million of Turkish exports 
to Iran and about $700 million of imports from that country” if it participated in the 
em bargo .T urkey  needed Iranian natural gas and the two countries “concluded 
petroleum, and a 23-year natural gas agreement in May 1995”*^' with which they 
agreed on the construction of a pipeline to transport Iranian gas to Turkey by July 
2001. However, although Turkey needed Iranian gas, it did not want to alienate the 
U.S., so that Ankara did not fulfill its obligations under the agreement on time. 
Moreover, Turkey took into consideration the U.S. opposition to the agreement with 
Iran, in which Turkmenistan gas was to be transported to Turkey through Iran, and 
did not sign the agreement at first However, later an agreement was signed and 
currently, Turkey buys gas from Iran.
On the other hand, even Washington was aware of the fact that Turkey should 
cooperate with Iran despite the fact that Turkey did not approve of Iranian policies 
and probable threats toward its neighbors and the whole world. Turkey could not rely 
only on the natural gas coming from Russia but had to secure another source and 
carry out the rules of the contract made on a “take-or-pay” basis with Iran.''·* Another
fundamentalism. There is ample o f data to argue that Iran exports fundamentalist activities to its 
neighborhood, and especially to Turkey, however, this is outside the scope ol this thesis.
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crucial point that needs to be stressed within the context of the U.S.-Turkish relations 
concerning Iran is that the U.S. periodically reminds Turkey of the possibility of 
developing better relations with Tehran, and in a way the U.S. holds out the option of 
choosing Iran rather than Turkey for the transportation of the Caspian oil to the 
world. When this type of eonsideration is taken into account, it has to be 
remembered that there is not real friendship between states, but only common or 
intersecting national interests. It would not be wrong to state that Turkey acted 
according to its national interests while cooperating with Iran despite the opposition 
of the U.S. Finally, the third Middle Eastern neighbor that became a problematic 
issue between Turkey and the U.S. was Syria.
3.4.3 Syria
The emergence of a de facto independent Kurdish entity after the Gulf War in 
northern Iraq increased fears in Syria, Turkey and Iran that similar incidents might 
occur on their lands with their respective Kurdish populations. Hence in 1992, these 
three states came together in Ankara and proclaimed a declaration that they would 
back the territorial integrity of Iraq.^ *" While this common threat brought Syria and 
Turkey together, Turkey and Syria did not completely agree nor did they apply 
similar policies on the problem. Although Syrian threat was not direct and imminent, 
Damascus, like Tehran and Baghdad, had been posing a threat for Turkey’s integral 
unity with its support of PKK activities. Hence the main conflicting areas between 
Turkey and Syria could be stated as the unresolved trans-boundary watercourses of
economic development. This argument against Turkey seems to be unfair wlien Turkey lias tlic right 
to protect its own national interests like the U.S. docs in many areas. Turkey does not have many 
options for getting gas, a main energy source for the large I urkish m.irket.
F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkish Foreign and Security Policy", m TheJiuture ol Turkisb-Weslern
Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan. p. 34. . . ,
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Euphrates/Tigris basin and Asi/Oxus River and Syria’s support for i’KK.''’ From 
Turkish point of view the major problem between Turkey and tlie U.S. concerning 
the trans-boundary watercourses is that the U.S. takes position according to its 
interests rather than being objective.
Turkey was worried about U.S. neglect of the Syrian support for PKK 
terrorism during the 1990s, because the U.S. did not include Syria on the list of 
countries supporting terrorism or otherwise put pressure on Syria to end its support. 
This U.S. avoidance lasted until Turkey itself coerced Syria to stop providing shelter 
for Abdullah Ocalan^^ in 1998 by threatening to take military action. This threat was 
taken seriously by Syria and resulted in the expulsion of Abdullah Ocalan from the
97 The disputes over trans-boundary watercourses between Turkey and Syria have long been 
unresolved and with the construction of Southeastern Anatolian (GAP) project, the disputes came into 
the agenda again in the eighties. Euphrates and Tigris originate in Turkish lands yet they also flow 
through Syria and Iraq before they join with Iranian gulf. Syria and Iraq arc concerned with the 
Turkish dams over Euphrates and Tigris. They blame Turkey for not allowing enough water to flow to 
their lands. Syria has always been more interested in this issue and it has also acted on behalf o f Iraq. 
The amount o f waters o f Euphrates flowing through Syria has never satisfied Damascus, and the 
Syrian capital increased its opposition against Turkey by convincing Arab states to support Syrian and 
Iraqi case on trans-boundary watercourses. However, on the Oxus River case, which originates from 
Lebanon and passes through Syria, and pours into the Mediterranean from Turkish land, Syria forgets 
all its accusations toward Turkey. Syria docs not really implement the international rules o f trans­
boundary waters. The Syrian dams use almost all the waters o f Oxus. For detailed information on 
Syrian-Turkish disputes on watercourses sec Hüseyin Pazarcı, “Su Sorununun Hukuksal Boyutları“, in 
Neşet Akmandor, Hüseyin Pazarcı, Hasan Koni (cds.), Ortadoüu Ülkelerinde Su Sorunu. (Ankara: 
TESAV, 1994); Konuralp Pamukçu, Fırat/Dicle Nehir Havzasındaki Su Sorunu ve Çözüm Arayışları, 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Ağustos 1994; and Murhaf Jouejati, “Water Politics as 
High Politics: The Case o f Turkey and Syria“, in Henry J. Barkey (ed.). Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's 
Role in the Middle East. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).
It was well known in Turkey that Abdullah Ocalan was accommodated in Damascus and Damascus 
became a center for planning PKK activities toward Turkey. In April I997,it was announced by the 
headquarters o f Chief o f the General Staff that Turkey would take political, economic and military 
measures against Iran and Syria if they continued to support fundamentalist and terrorist movements 
toward Turkey. It was seen that Syria did not really end its .support so that the Syrian-'fiirkish relations 
got tenser in September 1998. On 16 September 1998, General Commander of Land Forces, Atilla 
Ateş, stated in a speech made in Hatay Ankara’s dissatisfaction o f Syrian support for Abdullah Ocalan 
and PKK. Following this speech, Ankara initiated more serious precautions towards Syria such as 
ending diplomatic relations until Damascus ended its support for PKK and expelling Abdullah Ocalan 
from Syria. Seeing the ultimatum as a serious one Damascus accepted Ankara’s demands and finally 
the Ocalan Crisis o f 1998 ended with Adana Compromise in October 1998. 'fhis was a successful 
application o f Turkish foreign policy. Ankara demonstrated to the U.S. and the whole world how 
effective its foreign policy could be by threatening to use force against Syria unless it stopped its 
support for PKK. For details see also Melek Fırat & Ömer Kürkçüoglu, “Orta Doğu’yla İlişkiler 
(Relations with the Middle East)” in Baskin Oran, Türk Dış Politikası... pp. 563-67.
53
country and the declaration of ending its iniincdiatc support for PKK activities. “ 
This unilateral Turkish initiative towards Syria, pointed out tliat Turkey was 
powerful enough to take eare of its national interests indepeiulently if necessary. It 
could be evaluated as a message sent to the world in general and the U.S. in 
particular to demonstrate that Turkey was determined to solve its problem ol PKK 
terrorism and it makes good on its threat. In this issue, the U.S. seemed to be on the 
Turkish side since it did not really interfere with the issue.
To summarize, it could be stated that during the 1990s providing stability and 
peace in the region; free flow of oil; and establishing better relations with the 
countries were among the major interests of Turkey and the U.S. in the Middle hast. 
Nonetheless, the objectives of Turkey and the U.S. did not overlap all the time, and 
in such situations, Turkey tried at least to act according to its national interests, 'fhis 
was a significant change for Turkey’s foreign policy, since Turkey was learning how 
to stand on its own feet in an environment free of Cold War concerns. l ienee, this 
helped Ankara to formulate its own foreign objectives when it did not have common 
policies with the U.S. over issues related to Armenia, Greece and Cyprus.
3.5 Real Conflicts or Confroiilafioiis in Objectives
3.5.1 Armenia
Turkish-Armcnian relations have never been smooth because of longstanding 
Armenian allegations that the Ottomans massacred Armenians in 191.5 during WWI. 
These Armenian claims have prevented the establishment of friendly relations 
between Turkey and Armenia not only under the Soviet rule of Armenia but also 
after Armenia got its independence in 1991. On the other side, the Armenian-
Ibid, p. 33.
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American lobby brought the genocide issue into tlic agenda in the U.S. Congress and 
they tried to prevent U.S. military aid to Turkey.
Nevertheless, besides this historical antagonism toward Turkey, the negative 
atmosphere between Turkey and Amicnia increased with the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict in the post-Cold war period. Armenia occupied about 20% of the Azeri land 
of Nakhichevan in 1992, and claimed this land to be part of Armenia. Therefore, 
Turkey took the Azeri side not only because it had historical ties with Azerbaijan, but 
also because Turkey could not accept Anncnian occupation of Azeri land. Hence the 
already poor relations between Turkey and Anncnia wonsened. Turkey as a country 
facing the conflict in its very close neighborhood, immediately worked for 
“mobilizing governments and international forums to condemn Armenian acts’’. 
Subsequently, Turkey demanded that Armenia “abandon its ‘expansionist 
policy’”.'®'
The U.S., on the other hand, immediately wanted to see better relations 
between Turkey and Armenia. Because of the Anncnian-Amcrican lobby in 
Washington, Armenia’s importance increased in U.S. policies. However, Armenia 
was not well connected to the rest of the world and especially to the Wc.stcrn world, 
since it is a land-locked country on the Asian continent with no access to the .seas. In 
order to be successfully integrated into the Western world Armenia needed Turkey’s 
support. Only when Turkey opens its borders to Armenia could Yerevan establish 
meaningful relations with the world and especially with Turkey. This would decrease 
Armenian dependence on Russia, and more significantly might akso end the negative 
Armenian-American lobbying in Washington against Turkey, though this was not a
Kemal Kirişçi, “The End of the Cold War and Changes in liirkisli I'orcign I’oliey Beliavior". I99.t, 
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guarantee, since there is a difference between diaspora Armenian nationalism and 
Armenia proper. Hence for stability and peace in the region, the U.S. requested 
that Turkey make life easier for Annenia."’^  However, it was clearly .seen that only 
after the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could Tiirkish- 
Armenian rapprochement and cooperation be observed in the reuion.*"^
However, despite U.S. optimism on the i.ssue, the international community 
did not see any real Armenian effort to retreat from the occupied lands. While at 
times Ankara thought of ending its embargo against Armenia because it has also 
damaged Turkey, Armenia did not cease its historical claims about Ottoman 
genocide. On the other side, despite the U.S. initiatives to start cooperation between 
Turkey and Armenia, Turkey could not really come clo.scr to Armenia because of its 
economic ties with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan was promising a vital role in the 
transportation of Caspian oil to the West on condition that Turkey continued its 
support for the Azeri case in the Azeri-Armcnian conflict. Thus this meant that 
Turkey’s hands were tied until a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Turkey could not 
dare to lose Azeris and the economic benefits of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ccyhan pipeline 
project. However, Turkey could strongly support the idea of multilateral peaceful 
solution to the problem that would benefit all the parties in the dispute.
If not resolved, the problematic issues between Turkey and Armenia would 
not only destroy their relations but also it could damage U.S.-Turkish relations. The 
unresolved issues alienated Amienia from Turkey and this situation has been 
affecting the Armenian-American lobby in the U.S. The pro-Armenian lobby in 
Washington has always been very influential. Thus, the Turkish lobbying firms,
Makovsky, “U.S. P o l i c y p p ·  244-45. 
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which aim to protect Turkish interests, cannot speak up as tlio pro-Armenian lobby. 
The scattered and numerically inferior voting power furkish-Americans in tlie U..S. 
arc usually defeated by the Armenian-Americans when their voting power is taken 
into account. Hence the delay in arms sales to furkey during the 1990s could be 
connected to the effectiveness of the Armenian lobby. On the other side, furkish 
relations with Greece over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus hardened U.S.-'furkish 
relations during the 1990s.
3.5.2 Turkish-Grcck Disputes and Cyprus
Turkish-Greek conflicts over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea continued unresolvetl 
during the 1990s as a legacy from the Cold War period. These conllicts demonstrated 
the “continuity” process of Turkish foreign policy regarding its relations with Greece 
and the U.S., which was indirectly involved in these issues. The U.S., having strong 
ties both with Turkey and Greece insisted on a resolution of the Cyjirus problem."*' 
Furthermore, the U.S. pressured Turkey to make concessions in order to reach a 
compromise on Cyprus not only during the Cold War but also during the 1990s. This 
pressure intensified the discontent created between Turkey and the U.S. Additionally 
this discontent decreased the reliability of the U.S. admini.stration in the eyes of 
many Turkish officials."*^’
On the other side, Greek-Ainerican lobbies in the U.S. Congress were very 
effective in U.S. foreign policy making and usually Washington could not get rid of 
this influenee over issues related to Turkey. Like the Armenians, the Circck- 
Americans used the lobbying card against Turkey. The pro-Cireck lobby affected the 
Congress and usually they forced Washington to veto U.S.-'furkish agreements on
Özden Z. O. Alanlar, “ Türkiyc-ABI) İlişkilerinin (iiivcniik Boyiilniula Dönüşümü ( I'he 
Transformation ofTurkish-U.S. Relations in Security Dimension)“, in Hn tl/un ()nyil:...,( I he l.oni’est 
D ecade...). p. 239.
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financial aid or arms sales. Furthennorc, this rivalry was making tlic U.S. part of all 
Greek-Turkish relations. Thus, the U.S. appeared as a third party in every tiisputc 
between Turkey and Greece, not only during the Cold War but also in the post-CoId 
War decade. In 1996, with Imia/Kardak crisis, Turkey and Greece came very close to 
war, yet the U.S., as a stabilizing factor, calmed down both Turkey and Greece. This 
U.S. contribution to the conflict could be explained as a necessity of U.S. interests. It 
is well known that continuing Turkish-Greek disputes threaten stability in the entire 
eastern Mediterranean and create havoc in NATO alliance."’^
Taking this fear into consideration, the U.S. promoted the idea of bringing 
Turkey and Greece once more to the table to deal with their problems. In 1997, the 
Madrid Summit was prepared by U.S. initiative for the improvement of bilateral 
relations between Turkey and Greece. However, the post-summit declaration pointed 
out that this summit was only an initial step, and there were no resolutions proposed 
for the decades-long conflicts.'*’*
Nevertheless, in 1999 “the earthquake diplomacy” once more increased 
Turkish-Greek prospects for better relations. Athens, which was suffering from 
international criticism because of its support given to PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, 
in Kenya, had tried to dispel this negative image. The earthquake in Turkey followed 
by those in Greece provided the most convenient atmosphere for Greece to establish 
closer ties with Turkey by helping the victims of the earthquake. Turkey’s optimistic 
response to this humanitarian assistance from Greece most probably satisfied the 
U.S. the most. However, this rapprochement could still not be converted into a
'o'lbid.
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Greek Relations)”, in Türk Dıs Politikasının Analizi (The Analysis o f Turkish Forcimı PolicvT cd. 
Faruk Sönmezoğlu, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2001), pp. 543-44.
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solution to the disputes in the Aegean Sea or ( y|irus. as o|iposed to closer 
cooperation in soft politics such as trade, tourism, and antiterrorism.'" ’
It was obvious that Turkish-Greek disputes over Cyprus aiul Aegean would 
not be easily icsolvcd as long as these two countries failed to stop seeing each other 
as an existential threat, and the U.S. and the other Western countries were at a loss as 
to what to do about issues related to Turkish-Greek disputes. 1 he HU membership of 
Southern Cyprus without the resolution of the Cyprus conllict would make it harder 
to get along well. Therefore, it is possible to .sec the U.S. or HU repeatedly on the 
scene trying to convince Turkey and Greece to reach a compromise on the disputes. 
In addition to disputed issues, Turkey and the U.S. reached a common policy over 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan because of common interests in the region, yet economic 
problems resulted in delays.
3.6 Major Fields of Cooperation but Without Conclusion
3.6.1 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceylian
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the independent Caucasian and Central 
Asian states gained more power and control over the natural resources within their 
countries. Thus with the emergence of the Caspian region and its high potential for 
supplying oil and natural gas, the world’s attention turned towards this region. 
Turkey, which decided to improve its historical relations with the Caucasian and 
Central Asian states, saw the Caspian resources as an alternative to its growing 
energy needs. If Turkey could get a share in the Caspian oil and persuade Azerbaijan 
and the Western states to export oil through Turkish lands, Ankara would not only 
find a suitable source for its domestic needs, but also would benefit from the pipeline 
route’s income. Nevertheless, this was not an easy t:isk since despite the Western
Makovsky, “U.S. Policy...”, p. 249.
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companies interests in the region, Turkey liad to compete with Russia and Iran, 
which also wanted to be involved in the transportation of Caspian oil and natural
gas no
In line with this objective, Turkey tried to c.stablish closer diplomatic and 
political ties with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan and signed many 
bilateral and multilateral agreements with these countries. Even in the very beginning 
of the 1990s, Turkey initiated the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project through which 
Caspian oil would be transported to the West. Subsequently, Turkey marshalled 
diplomatic support for this project from Washington and got it; however, this was not 
the only alternative. Russia and Iran were the other two strong alternative routes, 
while Bulgaria and Ukraine also suggested alternative plans for the transportation of 
Caspian oil to the West, despite the limitations and unfeasibility of their projects."'
The U.S. supported Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project because with this 
project Georgia, instead of Russia was involved in the transportation route, and if 
possible, the U.S. would also prefer to see Armenia involved. For Washington, this 
project was a real alternative for decreasing reliance on a Russian pipeline, the Baku- 
Novorossiysk, which might give Russia a monopoly over the region. The alternative 
route proposed by Iran to use the Persian Gulf met strong U.S. opposition because 
the U.S. did not want to see Iran in the transportation of Caspian oil."“ On the other 
side, the U.S. acknowledged Turkey’s concerns about the environmental risks of oil 
transport through the Turkish Straits and the Marmara Sea. Thus, once more the U.S. 
supported the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) route since this pipeline would lessen 
tanker traffic in the Turkish Straits, Bosporus and Dardanelles.
Sabri Sayan, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Fra: Tlie Cliallenges o f Multi- 
Regionalism”, Journal o f Intenmlwnol Affairs. Vol. 54, No. 1, (Fall 2000). pp. 169-182, pp. 17.V74. 
'"Jan H. Kalicki, “Caspian Energy at the Crossroads”. Foreian Af/airs. Vol. 80, No. 5, 
(Scptcmber/Octobcr 2001), pp. 120-134, p. 124.
60
Nonetheless, despite U.S. support for the constmction of the Baku-Tbilisi- 
Ceyhan pipeline, this Turkish initiative had its disadvantages, fhe construction of 
BTC pipeline had a high cost when compared to the other alternatives such as Baku- 
Supsa, Baku-Novorossiysk, and the Iran-Pcrsian Gulf route. According to different 
feasibility studies, it was estimated that the cost might increase from .$2,4 billion to 
$2,7 billion. And this cost was too high for the Western companies, which viewed 
the other alternatives commercially as more convenient. This economic disadvantage 
decreased the attractiveness of the pipeline. Nevertheless, Turkey was determined to 
realize this project, and “guaranteed to cover construction costs of above $1,4 billion 
for the section of the pipeline that passes through Turkish territory” since Ankara 
supported the construction of this pipeline not only because of economic interests but 
also because of its political benefit of extending its role in the region."'*
Although the U.S. support for BTC pipeline did not end, the U.S. realized 
that it had underestimated Russian influence over the states in the region. It was an 
explicit fact that the U.S. should not irritate the Russian Federation and once more 
make it the enemy of the West but give credit to Russian initiatives. Turkey also was 
aware that rather than antagonizing Russia it should cooperate on issues directly 
related to their interests. However, Ankara should also not let Russia dominate the 
regional arrangements such as oil and natural gas routes.
Only when Turkey pursues policies that preserve the economic and political 
interests of the states in the region, could it continue to receive U.S. support for 
Turkish initiatives such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ccyhan project. It could be argued that
Karaosmanoglu, “Turkey’s Objectives... , p. 157.
JanH. Kalicki, p. 131.
"" Karaosmaoglu, “Turkey’s Objectives...’’, p. 157.
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Turkey should also be aware of the U.S. policy objectives. It was .sect that the 
U.S. wanted to enter into Caucasus and Central Asia to take control over the rich oil 
and natural gas reserves in order to decrease the Russian influence in the region. It 
was a great opportunity for Turkey to possess overlapping policies with the U.S. 
regarding the region since Ankara also wanted to have a crucial role in the reuion. 
Turkey shared the U.S. and Western approaches to the Caspian oil. More 
significantly, Turkey was conscious about the fact that it needed and would need 
U.S. support to be able to find Western companies to sponsor and finance the Baku- 
Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. Finally Turkey began to wait for a more determined Caspian 
policy from the Bush administration.
In conclusion, despite the short-term failures in Turkish Trans-Caucasian 
policy, it was noteworthy that Turkey did not give up the idea of playing a crucial 
role in this region. Although it seemed that Russia has increased rivalry with Turkey 
by protecting its military and political presence in Amicnia and Azerbaijan, Turkey 
would not dare to give up since these states arc important for Turkish interests. In the 
long run, it is highly possible that these states will need Western and especially 
Turkish assistance to solve their regional problems in order to become politically and 
economically independent states."^’ Hence Turkey should be ready to help them 
whenever they need support. On the other side, the U.S. assisted many Turkish 
initiatives that emerged after successful Turkish foreign policies.
The main USA policy objectives toward tlic region; a) strengtliening tlie independence and 
prosperity o f  the new states; b) encouraging political and economic reform: c) mitigating regional 
conflicts by building economic linkages between regional states; d) bolstering the energy security o f  
the USA and its allies and regional states by ensuring the free How o f oil and gas to the world market; 
and c) enhancing commercial opportunities for US and other companies. Ali Karaosmanoglu. 
“Turkey’s Objectives...”, p. 158. He also quotes from Turkish Duily News. 10 December 1998, p. A.T
Süha Bölükbaşı, “Ankara’s Baku-Centered Trans-Caucasian Policy: lias It l·ailedr’. MuUlle East 
Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, (Winter 1997), pp. 80-94.
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3.7 Turkish Foreign Policy Initiatives Encouraged and Assisted by the VS.
3.7.1 Military Cooperation with Israel
With the 1993 peace process of Oslo, where the Declaration of Principles was signed 
between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), relations between 
Turkey and Israel were elevated into another dimension. The “ups and downs” in the 
relations between Turkey and Israel after the emergence of the state of Israel were 
related to Turkish concerns about peace between Israel and the Arab world in general 
and Palestine in particular. Nevertheless, the Declaration of Principles became a sign 
of hope for the Arab-Israeli peace, and Turkey accepted this as a basic milestone to 
develop its relations with Israel. Thus, 1996 became a turning point for the bilateral 
relations of Turkey and Israel.
Since the military cooperation and training agreement in February 1996, 
which permitted the Israeli air force to exercise in Turkish skies and following a free 
trade aeeord in March, the number of bilateral agreements between these two states 
has grown to thirteen.”  ^ The military cooperation was concentrated on weaponry 
upgrade, hardware purchase, joint production, training, and intelligence sharing 
while, on the other side, the Turkish-Israeli relationship also necessitated cooperation 
in trade, transportation, and water."** In this sense, the military cooperation started as 
soon as the agreements were put into practice.
The changing conditions in world politics and especially in the Middle East 
pointed out that better Turkish-lsracli relations would serve the interests of both. It 
was obvious that closer relations with Israel would help furkey to overcome the
Daniel Pipes, “A New Axis: The Emerging I'urkish-lsraeli liiKenle·’. Tlw iVaiioiuil InicivM. 
(Winter 1997/98), pp. 31-38, p. 32.
"*Ibid, pp. 34-35.
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political and economic problems it faced during the 1990s " ' as a result of the losses 
in fight against PKK. tcirorism, in trade incomes after the (iulf War. and in terms of 
overall relations with other neighbors. Therefore, furkey's eoo|ieration with Israel 
could first enable it to put pressure on Syria, then the most hostile neighboring 
country because of its support for PPK. Later, the military cooperation would lead to 
Turkish access to “an arms relationship with a technologically advaneeil. Western- 
oriented, inventory-compatible state free of anti-Turkish lobbies“.'-" And finally. 
Turkey would gain support from the Amcrican-Jewish lobby, which had a very 
distinctive place in the Congress, against the pro-Greek, pro-Armeniati, pro-Kurdish, 
and human rights lobbies.'“' On the other side, Israel would also benefit both 
economically and militarily from the multilevel cooperation with Turkey. For Israel, 
Turkey would be a client of its military arsenal and would provide mountainous 
lands and open skies to exercise its military capability.
Seeing that such Turkish-Isracli cooperation would serve its interests, the 
U.S. from the beginning supported and even encouraged the cooperation becau.se this 
cooperation did not challenge U.S. interests in the region. From U.S. perspective this 
cooperation was
♦ A model o f regional normalization between Israel and a Muslim-majority stale;
♦ An opportunity for deeper trilateral cooperation, enhancing Israeli and Turkish security 
and increasing weapons of interoperability for IJ.S. forces at limes o f regional crisis;
♦ A source o f pressure on Syria ’s peace process policies,
♦ A potential means for the executive branch to bypass Congress in supporting Turkey 
(through presidential waivers on Israeli sales o f arms that include D.S.-origin 
technology); and
119 Dietrich Jung & Wolfango Piccoli. “The Turkish-lsraeli Alignment; Paranoia or Pragmalis 
Security Dialogue, Vol. 31 (1), (2000), pp. 91-104. p. 9S.
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♦ A potential nucleus for pulling other pro-U.S. Mates, such as Jordan, into a wider Middle 
Eastern regional security regime.'·’
Seen from the above conclusions, as two democratic states Turkey and Isniel 
would empower the stability of the region by promoting Western values such as 
democracy and liberalism to the authoritarian regimes of the Middle hast. Hence for 
the U.S., pro-American and democratically oriented states of the Middle East would 
lead to a peaceable Middle Easf’.'^ '^  Moreover, the U.S. support for this cooperation 
came as a result of unquestionable U.S. trust and support to Israel. Israel has always 
been a significant partner to the U.S. and Israel has almost represented the U.S. in the 
Middle East. Hence, the U.S. could not dare to frustrate Israel, and the Isracli- 
American interests almost always c o in c id ed .I t was clearly ob.served that with the 
Turkish-Israeli cooperation, the U.S. increased its influence in the Middle East and 
Mediterranean. This would provide the U.S. a better opportunity to take care of 
Israeli security among the hostile neighbors. On the other hand, the U.S. would 
become more influential in pressuring Syria to contribute to the Middle Eastern 
peace process.
3.7.2 The Arab-Israeli Peace Process
The emergence of Israel as a state in the Middle East in 1948 initiated the decades- 
long disputes between Israel and the Arab states of the region since Israel was 
established after the Israelis occupied some of the Palestinian land and bought the 
rest of it from the absentee Palestinians. Turkey’s closeness to Israel and to Palestine 
has varied in the past. However, Turkey did not waver in its insistence on the fact 
that an emergent peaceful resolution should be found. Ankara was aware of the fact
Makovsky, “U.S. Policy toward Turkey... 
Daniel Pipes, p. 38.
Seyfi Tashan, interview on 14.04.2004.
, p. 236.
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that stability of the Middle East was primarily dependent on the resolution this
conflict. Hence Turkey took a more detennined stance on the dispute during the 
1990s.
U.S.-Turkish interests converged again in the restoration of Middle Eastern 
peace. While the U.S. was concerned with the security and stability of the region and 
wanted peaceful resolution to the Arab-lsraeli dispute for the sake of the peaceful 
existence of Israel in the region, Turkey was also concerned with possible threats to 
security if a final agreement was not reached. Hence, Turkey strongly supportetl the 
Oslo peace process of 1993.'"*^ ’ For Turkey, this peace process was a very promising 
one, and Ankara really wanted a conclusion to be reached under the leadership of the 
U.S. Turkey has always encouraged the peace process but it also required that Israel 
and PLO solve their problems mutually.'“’ Turkey did not want to see any other 
regional power such as Syria as a third country in the peace process. Turkey would 
be concerned with a Syrian-lsracii rapprochement for the solution of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict since this would damage Turkey’s strategic interests because of 
Syrian support for PKK activities. More significantly, any U.S.-Syrian relationship 
concerning this issue would disturb Turkey because Syria was thought to be after
gaining impetus in the trans-boundary waters issue with Turkey and could easily
1relate it to the Middle Eastern peace process. ‘
The positive atmosphere of Oslo did not translate into lasting peace in the 
Middle East. The struggles and disputes continued in the following years, furkish 
concerns about Syrian demands did not materialize and especially aller the crisis
İlhan Uzgcl, “ABD vc NATO’yla ilişkiler”, p. 274. 
Nasuli Uslu, p. 349.
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surrounding Abdullah Öcalan in 1998. bilateral relations needed time to recover. 
Nevertheless, there has been a positive feeling that the Syriaii-Turkish ties would 
gain a new momentum once the main dispute over I’KK support ended. I his of 
course would be reflected in the Middle Hast process in the following years. Hence in 
another region vital for U.S. interests the U.S. .supported the furkish initiative ealleil 
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone.
3.7.3 The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone
Starting with the activist policy of Özal, Ankara applied a more assertive policy and 
got involved in almost all regional multilateral structures directly affecting Turkey’s 
interests or sometimes it even worked for the emergence of multilateral structures. 
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone was one of these initiatives.'**
Officially introduced by Turgut Özal, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Zone was established in 1992 in Istanbul with the intention of easing trade barriers 
and facilitating investment among Black Sea states. Furthermore, the BSIX’Z as a 
platform brought together neighbors that were in dispute with each other. For 
instance Greece-Turkey, Azcrbaijan-Armcnia, and others came under the same 
structure despite conflicts.''^*’
In the very beginning of the post-Cold war decade. Turkey realized that it 
could not remain isolated from its neighborhood, and realized that it should al.so 
enhance relations with its neighbors. Ankara realized that it should start with 
economics. The more economic interdependence increased, the moie jıolitical 
interdependence would arise between these states by leading to a stable and secure
For detailed infomiation of what really the BSFC/. propose<l to the region, the founding father of 
the BSECZ, Şükrü Elekdağ wrote different articles and issues. For inslanee see “Karadeniz Ekonomik 
İşbirliği (Black sea Economic Cooperation)” in Yeni Dünya Düzeni.vejïi.rkiye (New World (jo k l  
and Turkey). (Istanbul: Hava Harp Okulu Yayınları. 1992).
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regional order. Mainly, the BSECZ proposal of free movement of goods ami 
capital was welcomed by the Black Sea states and those states that did not share a 
Black Sea coast but were invited to become involved in the Zone.
The U.S. appreciated these Turkish efforts that contributed to regional 
stability. The U.S. supported the BSECZ, which aimed at bringing its members under 
the same platform to revive their economic relations and to resolve the problems 
between each other and to learn to improve cooperation not only in economics 
but also in all fields possible. Although some political and economic reasons 
prevented the BSECZ from meeting the expectations of the member states, Turkey 
deserved credit for its contribution to regional stability. It could be argued that 
economic interdependence would increase the possibility of political 
interdependence and this would lead to political stability and security in the region.
3.7.4 South- Eastern European Brigade (SEEBRIG)
Another regional multilateral initiative of Turkey was seen in 1998. As a neighbor 
Turkey was understandably concerned with Balkan security and stability. Hence 
Turkey, alarmed with the Serbian aggression toward Kosovo, propo.scd the initiation 
of a Balkan peacekeeping force in 1998. This multinational peacekeeping force in 
South-Eastern Europe would be mainly responsible for the security of the Balkans, 
and would be “deployed in NATO-or WEU- led operations sanctioned by the UN or
OSCE. ,1.1.1
In January 1999, the peacekeeping force was first born as a South-F.astcrn 
European Multinational Force (SEEMNF), and later turned into a South-Eastern
Kemal Kirişçi, “The End of...“, p. 24.
İlhan Uzgel, “Doksanlarda Türkiye...", p. 549.
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Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). lliis Balkan security force emerged with 4.n0() soldiers 
ill Athens with the main function of aid relief aiul peacekeeping.' ’ Bulgaria. Greece 
and Turkey were the three major countries alanued that Serbian aggression miglit 
even threaten their own existence in the Balkans so that they came together to form 
SEEBRIG and to provide the military personnel needed to deploy this force in any 
Balkan conflict.
The U.S., concerned with its own interests in Europe beside peace ami 
stability in the Balkans, backed up the idea of establi.shing this Balkan security 
initiative. This U.S. support came not only because the peacekeeping force would be 
helpful and ready to intervene in any Balkan dispute before it escalated into a 
conflict threatening the whole Balkan region, but also because it would be 
established under the NATO or WEU umbrella. This meant that the U.S. would have 
control over this initiative as a part of NATO and WEU. Moreover, another crucial 
part of this peacekeeping force from the U.S. point of view was that it would bring 
the Balkan states together in uni.son over possible Balkan conllicts. This would be 
beneficial for the security of the Balkans and U.S. interests in the region. I'inally, the 
U.S. supported Turkey’s candidacy to EU since it was interested in a pro-Western 
Turkish identity also for its own reasons.
3.7.5 EU Membership
U.S. support for Turkey’s foreign policy objectives al.so came with the issue of lUJ 
membership, an utmost foreign policy objective. It is widely believed that the U.S. 
backed Turkey’s membership for EU, and some even believed that the U.S. pushed
Zoran Ku.sovac. “Balkan Security to Set Up Rapid Reaelion |··orce··. Jam- ‘s Dcjcnsi· Weekly. (2() 
January 1999), Vol. 3. Issue No. 3.
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for Turkey s membership to the extent of (iisturbing its Western a l l ie s . 'I t  is also 
arguable that the U.S. believed that a Western oriented and KU member furkey 
could best serve its own and other Western countries' interests. Washington knew 
that a democratic, secular, and liberal Turkey would promote Western values. 
Moreover, Turkey s Western orientation and identity would become an example for 
many non-democratic regimes in the Middle East.
The U.S. played a crucial role in the ratification process of Customs Union 
Agreement between EU and Turkey in 1995.'^ ’^ From the U.S. perspective, Turkey’s 
EU membership has been significant for the economic and political stability of 
Turkey as well as of the whole region. Hence U.S. support for Turkey’s EU 
membership continued in the following years. The acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy 
in 1999 was undoubtedly related to U.S. backing and effort. 'The U.S. openly 
demonstrated its satisfaction when EU declared Turkey as a candidate state. 
Nevertheless, there arc some U.S. concerns about Turkey’s membership, since if 
Turkey becomes (though there arc serious concerns about whether it will ever 
become) a member of the union in the following years; and this might cause trouble 
for U.S. and its interests. It is arguable that a stronger anil EU member 'Turkey might 
raise its reservations about the U.S. more easily. Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
Turkey is not capable of opposing U.S. interests when they do not overlap with 
Turkish ones, yet an EU member Turkey’s confidence in its ability might be 
different.
While the U.S. now supports 'Turkey’s EU membership for the sake of 
increasing the Western orientation of Turkey, there is a possibility to lose Turkey as
Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey and (he Unilcd Stales: Ambivalent Allies", M iM v lüisl Review of 
huernalionalkfii'n-s. Vol. 2, No. 4. (December l ‘)98). pp. IS-27. p.21.
Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey and the United States...", p. 2 1: also Alan Makovsky, "U.S. Policy I oward
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a loyal political ally or junior partner when it becomes an i:U member. .An lili 
member Turkey might apply policies that could oppose U..S. objectives since not all 
EU policies coincide with U.S. intcrc.sts. Thus, it is probable that Turkey might be 
less dependent on the U.S. as a member of the EU."^ Nevertheless, when the history 
oi'T'urkish-American relations is studied, it will be concluded that neither Turkey nor 
the U.S. would give up their alliance. The strategic relationship between Turkey and 
the U.S. and common interests necessitate that they continue to aet in harmony 
unless the circumstances change since there arc no permanent friends or foes in 
international relations. However, this relationship based on reciproeal interests did 
not totally erase the doubts and reservations they had towards each other.
3.8 U.S. Reservations about Turkey
Beside areas of political and economic cooperation where Turkey and the U.S. have 
applied similar foreign policies, there have also been issues on which neither Turkey 
nor the U.S. could easily trust each other or support each other’s policies. Two oT 
these subjects, on which the U.S. had rc.scrvations about Turkey’s policies, were the 
issues of human rights and PKK terrorism. From a Western point of view these two 
issues were interrelated.
There has always been a gap between Ankara and the Western capitals 
regarding the issue of PKK and its activities in 1 urkey. Tor 1 urkey, the Kurdish 
question was “a domestic issuc”'^ '^  in which PKK terrorism threatened not only the 
security but also the integral unity of the Turki.sh .state. On the other side, the Kurdish 
question was also “a foreign policy issue” because of the Kurdish populations in
Seyfi Ta^han. 14.04.2004; also Alan Makovsky. "U.S. Policy...", p. 24S.
Philip Robins, “The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue", ¡ntcnuitioiuil Alfairs. 
Vol. 69, No. 4, (1993), pp. 657-676. on p. 659.
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Iraq. Iran. Syria, ami huropc. l urkcy did noi ;ict iinil.iici.illy bin it mt.> .K\.>unt 
its neighbors views while it was ileterinining its soiiihe.isicm |’oIk \ .
The U.S.. e\en before the Western l-.nropean coiinincs dul. .icccpicd I’KK as 
a terrorist organization, and usually was more sensitive about the l iiikish eonecin on 
PKK terroiism. However, in the post-( old War era. W ashington entphasi/ed the 
need for a political resolution to this problem, like the Huropcans did. Dilfercni lioni 
the Cold War era, the U.S. related the I’KK issue to human rights. llowe\er. I ’.S. 
insistence on the recognition ol wider rights for the Kurdish population in I iirkev 
was not welcomed by the lurks since this was viewed as a domestic problem in 
which the U.S. did not have the right to interfere.
During the I9 9 0 .S ,  whenever furkey approached the buropean Union, the bU 
countries put forward the human rights i.ssue as a precondition for furkey's Id) 
accession. Moreover, some PKK .sympathizers from the W'estern countries believed 
that the terrori.st leader Ücalan and the PKK were representing Kurdish interests, and 
accepted them as freedom lighters in the Kurdish n;itionalist movement. t hese 
people even ignored the fact that most of the civilitm Kurdish population supported 
neither the PKK and their violence, nor the idea of .separate Kunlish state."'
Although the U.S. was not as prejudiced as some of the W’estern states. 
Washington used “public diplomacy, quiet diplomacy and efforts" to encourage 
Turkey to promote its human rights performance, because, according to Henri .1. 
Barkey, the U.S. cared about Turkey."' The most effective pressure the U.S. ajiplietl
' Ibid. p. 670.
Yalım bralp. “An Insider’s View...", p. 116.
Michael Radii, “ riie Rise and the I'all (il'l’KK". Orbiy \'<.|, l.s. Nn. I. (W mier .!U(ll). pp. I To y  p, 
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over Turkeys low profile human rishls rocor.1 was ,l,c implici, cmharg
sales.
iruo on arms
Nevertheless, while Turkey continued its fight against terrorism. Ankara also 
began to revise the Turkish legal system and the Constitution, and even made very 
important changes concerning the human rights issue. Turkey as a liU eandidate state 
under requirements of the Copenhagen criteria, has already initiated the process of 
reforming the Constitution in order to fulfill its obligations and eradieate major 
sources of Western c ritic ism .W h en  Turkey implements all the Copenhagen 
criteria and puts them into practice Turkey’s fate and future will alter, and it may 
decrease the U.S. and Western countries’ rc.scrvations about its Western identity. On 
the other hand, Turkey also had reservations about the U.S., since after the Gulf War 
of 1991 Iraq became a problem for Turkey especially concerning the issue of 
northern Iraq.
3.9 Turkish Reservations about the U.S.
Post-Cold War conditions brought new opportunities and challenges to the U.S. as 
the single superpower. Starting with the Gulf War’s success the U.S. intensified its 
determination to take control over all regions important for U.S. interests. Removal 
of Saddam Hussein from Iraq was among the primary objectives of the U.S. aller the 
Gulf War, so that Washington supported all occasions that would .serve this purpose. 
In such an atmosphere, in order to overthrow Saddam, Washington backed the tribal 
Kurdish population in northern Iraq to declare their autonomy. Nevertheless, this
Henri J. Barkcy, p. 223. During llic 1990s, U.S. Congress diil not allow Washington to send three 
frigates paid for before, despite the agreements made between l urkey and tlie IJ.S. I liis was one o f  
the reasons that led Turkey to initiate military cooperation with Israel.
Aslan Gündüz, “Human Rights and Turkey’s ruture in Hurope". Orhis. Vol. 4>. No. 1. (Winter 
2001), pp. 15-30.
73
consideration disturbed Turkey, which did not welcome Ihe idea of an iiuiepeiuient 
Kurdish state near its border.
After the Gulf War Turkey began to .support the idea of eslabli.shing a no-lly 
zone” or “safe havens” in northern Iraq, and allowed “Poised I lammer” operations to 
take place from Turkish soil to control north of the thirty si.xth parallel, although 
Ankara was worried that this could increase the power of Kurtlish entities in the 
region. Nevertheless, Turkey had to make a difficult decision and support the U.S. on 
its Poised Hammer ’ policy in return for cooperation against PKK terrorism at home.
In the beginning, northern Iraqi Kurds seemed to be dependent on furkey for 
most of their needs, and they avoided disturbing Ankara. However, it was not certain 
how long this would last. '"*** On the other side, the U.S., by not allowing the Kurdish 
parties of KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and PUK (Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan) to compromise with Saddam Hussein and the Baghdad regime, willingly 
or not let the doors open for an independent Kurdish state. The initial clues for this 
were U.S. acquiescence in increasing autonomy of the de facto Kurdish state. 
Furthermore, Turkish concerns about U.S. reliability increased when .some Turkish 
reports stated that the allied coalition forces were secretly arming PKK camps in 
northern Iraq.''’^
For Turkey, unlike the U.S., regional stability could be proviiled only with 
the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity. Achieving regional stability was 
dependent on Baghdad obeying UN Security Council re.solutions, which envi.saged 
international monitoring of Iraqi weapons program. According to Ankara, this would
Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Turkey’s policy in northern Iraq. 199I-199.S". M iM c ¡uisicrn Siiidics. Vol. 
32, No. 4, (October 1996), pp. 343-366, on p. 360.
'"’ ibid, p .35I.
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end most of the political and economic constraints on rurkisli-lrac|i relations anil it 
strongly supported the idea of international monitoring.'·*^
In short, by 2000 many Turks were still annoyed with the idea that the U.S. 
administration might have intentions of creating a new Kurdish state in northern Iraq, 
and that Turkey would have to accept this reality as a fait accompli. Although the 
U.S. assured Turkey that this was not true, neither former U.S. deeds nor present 
U.S. intentions on Iraq helped to allay Turkish anxiety on this subject.'"'* Hence, alter 
pointing to U.S.-Turkish areas of divergence and convergence during the 1990s, it is 
time to analyze their relationship and draw conclusions about whether it is essential 
for both sides and to what extent it will shape the tics between Turkey and the U.S. in 
the future.
Ibid, pp. 360-61. 
Yalını Eralp, p. 116.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATIONS ON U.S-TURKISH REI.ATIONS
4.1 The Mutual Importance of U.S.-Turkisli Relations
Because of the existence of a common threat, during tlic Cold War, U-S.- furkish 
relationship became solid in this period. However, despite the end of the Cold War, 
Turkey s significance for the U.S. did not disappear in this period since other 
exogenous factors began to raise Turkey’s profile in the region. According to Alan 
Makovsky, Turkey is
a moderate, pro-Western state in an unstable area; a rare, probably unique, example of 
democracy, however, flawed, in a Muslim majority state; a supporter of Israeli-Palestinian 
peace and a peace-setter in Islamic world normalization with Israel: a base for Operation 
Northern Watch, which enforces a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, a key element of 
Washington’s Iraq strategy; an ideological counterweight to Iran; a buffer against resurgence 
o f Russian aggression; a forceful but pacific and anti-separatist advocate of the causes of 
besieged Muslims in its region (Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kosovo), all of whose 
kin are liberally represented in Turkey’s population mix; an important, non-Russian line of 
communication with the West, and to some extent a role model, for the still-unsteady furkic- 
languagc states o f former Soviet Union; and a potential outlet for ( aspian Sea energy 
resources as an alternative to Russian and Iranian routes.'’^”
All the above-mentioned issues indicated the significance attributed to Turkey by the 
U.S. in the decade examined. Although there had been some doubts at the very 
beginning of the decade that Turkey lost its significance, very .soon it was seen that 
this idea was not accurate. Turkey did not lose its significance; instead, it was 
promoted to the status of being a “ front-line state” by U.S. officials, who believed
Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism...”, p. IOS. Also these points attributed to I iirkey concerning 
its importance for LJ.S. initiatives and strategies are stated by Alan Makovsky. "U.S. Policy toward
76
ISthat Turkey gained more strategic importance than during tlic Cold War. since it
located at the very center of many regions,'·'' where U.S. interests either had to be 
preserved or initiated.
From the U.S. perspective, Turkey’s role and importance in the post-C’old 
War era accelerated especially after the U.S. decided to be more selective toward the 
developing world by focusing mainly on pivotal states rather than dispersing its 
attention and resources among all countries in the world. Turkey was labeled a 
pivotal state by U.S. officials, since it had the potential of becoming a regional 
power. Because of that it also required U.S. attention. With “its large population”, 
important geographical location”, “economic potential”, and more crucially with 
“its capacity to affect regional and international stability” Turkey became a state that 
could influence the future of the areas strategically important for the U.S. in the eyes 
of U.S. officials. In this decade, Turkey acquired a freer access to the resources of 
the Caucasus, Central Asia, and to Middle East, which arc not under the Soviet 
sphere of influence anymore. Simultaneously, in Europe, the dis.solution of 
Yugoslavia and the emergence of new independent states in the Balkans seeking 
economic and military assistance increased Turkey’s role as a provider and protector 
of peace and stability of these regions as a U.S. ally.
As a bridge between East and West, North and South, Christendom and 
Islam, Turkey has a special place in U.S. politics. The U.S. has kept in mind the fact 
that Turkey has had many political, economic, demographic, and even social
Turkey: Progress and Problems”, in T u rk ey’s Traiisrormation ami American Policy, l-d. Morton 
Abramowitz, (New York: The Century Foundation. 2000). p. 222.
Alan Makoysky, “The New Actiyism...”. pp. 108-09.1 le quotes from a speech by tJ.S. Deputy 
Secretary o f  State Strobe Talbott, “U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Age o f Interdependenee”. delivered at 
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 14. 1998, and Assistant Secretary o f State for 
European Affairs Richard Holbrooke (a statement before the I louse International Relations 
Committee, March 9, 1995).
Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy. “Piyotal States and U.S. Strategy . / o/v/g/i 
Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1, (January/ February 1996), pp. .TJ-50, pp.
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problems at home; however, it always recalled that stability in Turkey would be to 
the benefit of the U.S. and its interests in the neighboring pro-NATO and pro-Israel 
states.'^^ Therefore, when the U.S. thought of Turkey and its security and stability, it 
had to take into consideration the whole region encircling Turkey in order to be sure 
about the security of Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. Balkans and Western 
Europe. There was a possibility that any dispute in any of these regions important to 
the U.S. might spread to the others.
Another important factor that shaped the U.S.-Turkish relationship was arms 
trading. The U.S. has been the main provider of arms for Turkey, which has long 
been dependent on military imports. The U.S. and Turkey have been connected 
through “a salesman-client” connection. Neither the U.S. nor Turkey could afford to 
lose each other. While the U.S. would not manage to lose Turkey, which has been an 
important arms customer since the end of World War 11, Turkey also could not 
envisage losing the U.S., a major arms merchant providing arms for Turkey in an 
unstable neighbourhood that necessitates a strong m ilita ry .T hus the continuity of 
this reciprocal military trade relationship has served not only Turkish interests but 
also U.S. interests, since the U.S., despite some low profile embargoes, wouUl not 
really like to decrease its arms sales by losing a crucial client such as Turkey.''“' 
Therefore, from this military dimension, it could be stated that both the U.S. and 
Turkey would preserve their significance in the eyes of the other as long as this 
relationship does not harm the interests of the other.
Ibid, pp. 47-48.
154 During the nineties there were four ways for 'Turkey to obtain arms. Through I) l·■orcign Mililary 
Sales (FMS); 2) Direct Commercial Sales (DCS); .1) Pentagon's program ol l-.xeess Delense Article 
(EDA); 4) cascading method of Conventional forces in f.uiope (( I I.). Ilh.m tJ/gel. AIII) \e  
N A T o’yla İlişkiler”, p. 287.
Ramazan Gözen, “Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri ve fiirk Demokrasisi: 'Realist Haglanlı ( I ıırkısh- 
Amcrican Relations and Turkish Democracy: ''Realisl" Connection)”, in B üİ l viLni.nJhş Politika 
Gündemi- Kimlik nnmokrasi. niivcıılik rfurkislı Toreiim Policy Agenda: ldenl_ıl.w.l)eı.ııoeıaey,
7<S
From Ihe Turkish point of view, the U.S. I«s bcai n ............. .. cssemini ally.
which could no. be eas.ly ignored or renounced. The U.S. also strongly supponed 
Turkey’s efforts to beeome a candidate for EU membership. This backing from the 
U.S. had a very important meaning for Turkey, since it has Ikcu expecting to be 
accepted as a candidate for a long time. This U.S. support was apprccialeci by Turkey 
not only because the U.S. was an ally but also bccau.se the support c:ime alter Ihe 
EU’s rejection of Turkey’s candidacy in 1997 and 1998 respectively.'·'’ Thus U.S. 
support that continued even after Turkey received a candidate status in 1999 
increased the importance of Washington’s role for Ankara since by this support 
Turkey came closer to realize its objective of becoming an EU member.
Another sign pointing to U.S. significance in the eyes of Ankara came as a 
result of the U.S. support for Turkish initiatives. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey’s 
role in its neighborhood gained momentum and Ankara initiated economic and 
military models for regional cooperation. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Zone (BSECZ) and South-Eastern European Brigade (SEEBRIG) were two of these 
Turkish initiatives.'^’ Seeing that these Turkish initiatives would be beneficial for 
stability and order in the Balkans and in the Black Sea countries, not only in 
economic terms but also in security terms, the U.S. backed these regional 
cooperation zones. In spite of Turkey’s increasing regional importance, it was 
necessary for Ankara and for all states in the world to get U.S. support and approval 
to successfully make the initiatives work. Hence Turkish aims of leading ami helping
Security). Şaban H.Çalış, İhsan D. Dağı, and Ramazan Gözen (cds.), (Ankara. I.ihertc Yayınlan. 
2001), p. 109.
The main concern here was that the U.S. supported Turkey’s candidacy. Allhouyh the U.S. mit:hi 
have possessed different expectations or this support was serving U.S. interests, it was noteworthy that 
the support came and continued in a period when Turkey was really in need o f it. In the previous 
chapter o f  the thesis there is a much more detailed information of U.S. support given to Turkey
regarding Turkish-EU relations. . . , , ^ 1 1
BSECZ and SEEBRIG were two initiatives proposed by I urkey. l or ilclails on these suhjeels sec
the previous eliapter.
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the newly independent states in its neigliborhood to liavc a softer transition to 
Western nonns suited well, and even responded to the U.S. concerns ahoiii the 
stability and order in the Balkans and between the Black Sea region countries.
Not only an economically but also politically important project for Turkey 
was the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ccyhan pipeline. Hence to realize this project 
U.S. support was important. The initiation of this Turkish project, which was one of 
the less economically feasible routes when compared with the trans-Russian and 
trans-Iranian alternatives, required economically strong Western sponsors and 
political support from Washington. Once more the U.S. as a global power entered the 
scene and Turkey had to look for support from Washington. It was observed that 
despite the uncertainties about the new energy route’s fate U.S. support for the 
Turkish project continued not only as a favor for Turkey but also because the project 
has been serving U.S. interests in the Caucasus.'^**
To overcome its financial problems that have been really weakening Turkish 
economy for long time, Turkey needed U.S. backing and most probably approval 
whenever it applied for credits from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
funds from the World Bank. The U.S. was very influential in IMF policies, and 
whenever Turkey and IMF came together for negotiating a new “stand-by” 
agreement, Turkey also had to convince or give guarantees to the U.S. that it would 
conform to IMF rules. Hence only after U.S. approval could furkey make an 
agreement with the IMF. Beside U.S. support for Turkey’s getting IMF credits and 
World Bank funds, the U.S. itself was providing credits and economic and military 
donations to Turkey.
See also the previous ehapter for detailed analysis of U.S. stanee on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 
route.
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and l-on’iyn Military Sales (I-'M.S) programs, the I .'..S. gave l urkey military and 
economic assi.stancc through the nineties. On the other side, until IW.Vrmkev also 
received .some donations from the U.S. through I'M.S. Later however, the donation 
piograms eiitled and the limits ol U.S. credits grew tighter. This development 
brought Turkey a .short period of rela.xation yet the interest rates were so high that 
even though in 2()()0 the U.S. stopped its credits program. Turkey wouki continue 
repaying until 2016.'· Ankara had long been accustomed to living with foreign aiti 
and credits that really cau.sed troubles at home. Ironically; des|ute this mutual 
importance attributed to the signillcance of their relationship, lurkey's military 
empowerment as a regional state increased Washington’s doubts about lurkey's 
reliability.
4.2 U.S. Doubts about a “New T urkey”
At the very beginning of the decade the U.S. began to focus on the increasing 
significance of Turkey, and even began proposing a new role for Ankara in the post- 
Cold War era. It could be claimed that in the post-C'old War era, the already e.xisting 
interest for Turkey almost doubled in U.S. scholars’ environment because T urkey 
was at the center of many regions in which the U.S. was about to gain inlluenee. In 
such an atmosphere many experts on T urkey started t<) call T urkey a “pivotal state", 
“a frontline slate”, or “a regional power”. Sub.sei|uently, by proposing that I urkey 
with its secular and dcmocratie regime became a model Ibr the newly independent 
states (NiS) and even to all non-demoeratie slates in tlie region, the.se seliolars 
pointed out Turkey’s potential for becoming an inlluential country, promoting 
regional stability and democratic values.
15') İlhan U/gel. “AUD vc NAT'O’yla İlişkiler", pp. 2S-I-S7.
This increasing interest of many think thanks and especially RAND 
Corporation also widened Ankara’s vision of its role in the Balkans. Caueasiis & 
Central Asia, and Middle East. Therefore, Ankara gained confidence in its ability to 
fonnulate more independent foreign policies regarding the.se areas. To some e.xtent, 
with its involvement in multilateral cooperation fields, and even with Turkey’s 
multilateral initiatives, Ankara was trying to shape its role as a regional power. The 
U.S. seemed to be supporting Turkey’s increasing influence in the region at first. 
However, later Turkey’s military empowerment began to cause concerns for the U.S.
During the 1990s, it was seen that Turkey got stronger both politically and 
militarily, and it had more activism and power in its region when compared with the 
Cold War circumstances. Under changing conditions of the post-Cold War era, 
Turkey chose to have an activist foreign policy towards the countries with which it 
had once had no or low profile relations. This policy shift allowed Turkey to have 
more independence in its foreign policy than it ever had. Having gained power in 
political and military terms, Turkey clearly began to attach more importance to its 
own priorities and interests in its foreign policy objectives and in this way it may 
have ended up challenging U.S. hegemony. This new perspective in Turkish foreign 
policy led to concerns and doubts in Washington and it also caiKsed some experts on 
Turkey to become suspicious and alarmed.
Alan Makovsky stated those doubts and fears. According to him, Washington 
had doubts about whether “ ‘a new Turkey’ that is stronger, more prosperous, more 
regionally assertive, and more foreign-policy-independent” would have more or 
fewer common objectives with the U.S. on issues that were directly iniluencing U.S. 
interests.'^“ Makovsky also emphasized U.S. reservation and skepticism as to
160Makovsky, “Marcliing in Step, Mostly!”, Privaie Piew. (Spring 1999). pp..l0-.18. p. .17.
82
whether this new Turkey, which emerged as a regional power, would decrease or 
increase its reliability as an ally of the U.S.'^’' These U.S. doubts about the new 
Turkey indicated the anxiety the U.S. had toward Turkish foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, as a result of this concern and as a sign of comforting them.selves, 
officials in Washington focused on the fact that they would prefer a stronger Turkey 
to a weaker one since they believed that it was easier to cooperate with a stronger 
country, to the extent that Makovsky represented official U.S. views.
Another U.S. concern regarding Turkey’s freer policies during the 1990s 
came from Michael Hickok. He described how and why Turkey’s rising military 
capability as a new regional power annoyed Washington. This was a big difference 
for Washington, which was not accustomed to seeing Turkey act without “taking 
permission’’ from the U.S. or “act without U.S.’ information’’.'^ ’’ More significantly, 
Washington’s mixed emotions of suspicion, fear, and anger were reflected in 
accusations made against Turkey. It was claimed that Turkey contributed to regional 
instability and disorder because the already unpredictable Turkish security policy 
grew more so with the increasing military strength Ankara achieved in the 1990s. 
These claims were unfair and even prejudiced since Turkey had the right to protect 
its borders and Turkey was a reasonable enough country not to wage a war without 
having meaningful reasons. Moreover, it could be debated that this issue of
Makovsky, “New Activism...”, p. 109. 
Makovsky, “Marching...”, p. 37.
Michael R. Hickok, “Hegemon Rising; The Gap between Turkisli Strategy aiul Military 
Modernization”, Paranteters,{ Summer 2000), Vol. 30, Issue 2, (Academic Search Premier) I he 
quotation marks in the text arc not Michael Hickok’s but the author’s.
Ibid. The modernization process o f Turkish armed forces started even in the lO.SOs, yet this process 
accelerated in the 1990s again. The main aim o f the military modernization program was restructuring 
the military in both doctrine and equipment. Ankara initiated the program by upgrading the systems of 
F-5, F-4, and F-16 and by buying new technology helicopters. Later Turkey requested AWACS-type 
platforms. Turkey was also involved in the co-production o f tanks and Israel became important in 
upgrading Turkey’s military assets, especially tanks. For details on the modernization program see 
Ministry o f National Defense (Turkeyk White Paper-Defense I99X. (Ankara: Ministry o f National 
Defense, 1998). Ankara’s modernization program was succcssfidly put into practice.
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unpredictability was put forward by the U.S. as a way to sliow its dissatisfaction of 
growing Turkish influence in the region during the 1990s.
It was clearly viewed from Washington that a more independent and assertive 
Turkish foreign policy, enhanced by the support of the modern Turkish armed forces, 
might not always accommodate U.S. interests. The effective cooperation of the 
government and the military in 1998 increased U.S. concerns on the issue. The 
Turkish-Syrian crisis of 1998 concerning Abdullah Öcalan’s expulsion from Syria, in 
which Ankara applied a more assertive policy toward Syria by threatening to u.se 
force if Syrian support for PKK continued, demonstrated Turkish activism but this 
also annoyed the U.S.'*"^  Ankara’s independent policy toward Syria annoyed 
Washington, because, according to officials in Washington, this policy could threaten 
stability in the region by causing a war between Turkey and Syria. Washington was 
anxious that any war between Turkey and Syria might spread to the region. The 
possibility of regional instability would directly damage U.S. interests in the region.
On the other side, Ümit Özdağ asserted that the U.S. was disturbed by the fact 
that Turkey as an emerging state might be able to follow independent regional 
politics that would not always enhance U.S. or its allies’ interests. Furthermore, he 
focused on U.S. annoyance resulting from the modernization process of the Turkish 
army, which empowered Turkey not only militarily but also politically by increasing 
the confidence of the governments in Ankara. By referring to l lickok’s concerns, 
Özdağ pointed out how uncomfortable the U.S. had become becau.se of the 
possibility of Turkey’s more independent behavior and growing influence in liurasia 
as it has been in the Turkish-Syrian crisis of 1998.
Ümit Özdağ, Gündem /inkara. Kanal A, 12.07.200.1. I'lıis TV program has a discussion format in 
which foreign and domestic issues of Turkey’s agenda arc discussed and analyzed. Mainly 
contributors to the program are Gündüz Aktau, retired ambassador. Dr. I lasan Ünal from Bilkcnt 
Univensity, and Alper Tan, journalist. In this specific program Ümit Özdağ replaced Gündüz Aktan.
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Tims, in a way. to take control over rnrkey's incrcasini; regional power, 
.some scholars like I lickok began to depict Turkish .Anneil I’orees as a threat not only 
to regional stability but also for the Turkish nation.'^*’ l-ven though this was not 
Washington’s official declaration, I lickok .stated this possibility. Hence, these 
.statements brought together the conelusion that the U.S. might also try' to benefit 
from the already existing domestic debate on the inlluence of military over politics. 
Although this was mainly an EU concern because of the superiority of democratic 
values, it was still arguable that decreasing intluence of military in Turkish foreign 
policy could be also desirable for the U.S. and its regional interests. Nevertheless, it 
would be useful to view what main U.S. policies were applied by different 
administrations in Washington since it .seems that the Clinton and Hush 
administrations were not identical.
4.3 U.S. Policy Toward Turkey: From Clinton to Bush
In the early Clinton years, Washington was so involvetl in tiome.stie affairs that the 
significance of Turkey’s role in its region was not given due weight. I-rom the U.S. 
perspective, beside Turkish support given to Operation Provitle Comfort anil some 
initial expectations that Turkey might win over the furkie states of former Soviet 
Union, there were no other issues for which Ankara receiveil Washington s attention. 
However, Washington u.sually criticized Ankara for its Kurdish policy and human 
rights performance.
Only in the mid-1990s, after Clinton administration began to get involved in 
regional affairs, did Washington realize the strategie importance of Turkey. Richard
Omit Oztinu. Gündem Anknva. Ümit O/ılağ aiialy/cil Michael iliekok’s article “llciicinon 
Risine...” ami poinicil out the reasons of his coneerns about growing l urkish power in its region. 
Makovsky. "U.S. I’oliey...". p. 22.V
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Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary' ol State for l·.ıır()|1eaπ Affairs aiul M.ire (in>ssm.in. 
tlien U.S. aiiibassatior in Ankara, played a eriieial role in eoiu ineini; W’asbineton to 
initiate closer ties with Turkey. Tlie.se oflıcials recommended that Washington 
support Turkish foreign policy initiatives since they had already identified Turkey's 
.strategic role for U.S. global interests.''" It was viewed that ll.S.-Turkish relatit)iis 
evolved despite this process. U.S.-Turkish cooperation within NATO alliance in 
Bosnia first and Kosovo later became two e.xamples where Ankara aiul Washington 
shared common interests. It was seen that they would act together to stabilize regions 
important for their intcre.sts alongside other countries concerned about order and 
peace in the Balkans particularly and in the entire world generally.''’’
During two periods of the Clinton administration Turkey was governed by 
different eoalitions and the level of Turkish-U.S. relations was determined according 
to Turkish governments’ clo.seness to Western values. When Necmettin Hrbakan was 
Turkey’s prime minister between 1996 and 1997, Washington preferred to be 
cautious and distant toward Turkey. Brbakan government’s policies of turning 
toward Muslim countries were not appreciated either by Washington or by the 
seeular elite in Turkey. The U.S. did not approve of Krbakan’s foreign policy, which 
rejected We.stern orientations of “democratization and political reforms”' "  in favor 
of concepts of “Muslim brotherhood”. However, it had been the same Clinton 
administration that weleomed Bülent Hcevit’s coalition government in 1997 despite 
the fact that Ecevit was the prime minister who undertook the Cyprus intervention in 
1974. Unlike Erbakan, Ecevit was a pro-Western leader, who believed in democracy
Ibid. pp. 22.V2-4.
I'or details on NA'I'O's out ofarea mission see Haskin Oran (ed.). lïiik l)is l\ditikasi, \'ol. 1. pp, 
.S67-6S. and Vol. 2. pp. 74.
Henri J. Darkey. " I lte landless I’lirsuil: linprovint; U.S.-l uikisli Itelations", (ed.) Moiton 
Abramowilz. The United Slates and Turkey: Allies in Need. (New York: Hie Cenliiry I'oundalion 
Press. 200.^). p. 2I.Y
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m,d human rights, and this helped Turkey and the t;,S. snstan, then ,e.„.d 
relationship.
The harmony of U.S.-Turkish relations probably resulted from pro-Western 
Turkish governments. It was noteworthy that Washington was satisfied with Turkish- 
Israeh military cooperation and improvements in Turkisli-Cireek relations in 
Nonetheless, the relatively tranquil U.S.-Turkish relations during the Clinton 
administration suffered to an extent after George W. Bush was elected as the new 
U.S. president in November 2000.
After Clinton’s period, the neo-conservatives got involved in pushing the new 
Bush administration to end senior Bush’s cautious policies regarding the Middle 
East. This time, according to the neo-cons, with its global power and influenee, 
Washington was ready to put into practice its alarming plans for the security of IJ.S. 
interests. Unlike the Clinton administration, which was interested in globalization 
and political change by demanding that its allies to focus on democracy and human 
rights in domestic affairs, the primary concerns of Washington’s agenda in the new 
Bush administration were “new security threats, weapons of mass destruction and 
ballistic missile defense’’.'^  ^Washington’s policy toward Turkey would be guided by 
these considerations. Although human rights and democracy were the main U.S. 
concerns to improve in all states of the world, the Bush administration would tiy to 
alter the focus of its strategic relationship with I urkey by emphasizing other 
common interests.
For Washington, Turkey’s importance as an ally increased, since the Bush 
administration’s policies of fighting against international terrorism and supporters of 
terrorism, required contribution from all democratic states. For a long time. Turkey
Henri J. Barkcy, “The Endless Pursuit. 
” Mbid, p .231.
, p. 2.30.
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had suffered from PKK aetivmes .,nd ,i lu.l to f,,hi |>kk lii,, ,, ti·,:.
experienee of r.ghtiny terrorism eould lielp the I S ,is f,H,t .■.•.ona mtern.m..:Ml 
terrorism. lurkey eould heeome a key actor m tlic lielit . i .m i i i s i  i . . u -. c a.iic·, it it 
sided with the U.S. against this global challenge, which mclmlcd mciilio'uin·,· 
Saddam Hu.s.sein in Baghdad. Hence, l urkey’s signilic.mce lot U .ishiiii’ion would In· 
evaluated according to its position in this light, and Scptcmhci II. ."nni I h c . i i i i c  . i 
tinning point in U.S.-1 urkish rchitions. Nonetheless, the issue ol l>emit sii.itevie 
partners had already been initiated by the adininisiration nl Mill ( linlnn and It eo\ers 
the period of our study; thus it is important to analyze I .’.S.-fuikish lel.itions liom 
this perspective al.so.
4.4 StrsUcgic Partnership hetween D.S. and I iirkey?
After forty years of Turki.sh-lJ.S. relationships largely guidai hy N.-\K) security 
commitments during the Cold War, the IddOs brought a new phase to I'.S.-liiikish 
bilateral ties. In the post-C'old War era. besiile their N.'\K) commitments, the path ol 
'furkey and U.S. converged in the Balkans. Middle Hast. Caiicasiis and Centi.il .’Xsia. 
Thc.se new challenges and opportunities increased the possibility of legional 
cooperation between Washington and Ankara by rliveisifymg then common 
interests. Hence, in .such a cireumstanee. not only security but also politic.il aiul 
economic orientations of U.S.-furkish relations should be taken into coiisidci.ilion to 
analyze the nature of this relationship.
It w'ill be useful to recall different ( fS.-1 i i ik is l i  policy aic.is mentioned m the 
previous chapter during the nineties, and to see on which occasions I S. l mkish 
interests diverged or converged before dr.iw ing a conclusion on how to icii.iine I S,- 
Turki.sh relalion.ship in the posl-Cold War era. It is essential to an.iK/e the entire
S.S
chain of relations between tlicse two states to make a meaningful chanicteri/ation of 
the relationship. Thus, the Gulf War between coalition powers and the Haghtlad 
regime became the first occasion in which Turkey supported the U.S. to the e.xtcnt of 
being deprived of Iraqi oil income. Another area where Turkey and U.S. acted 
together was in the Balkans. In Bosnia and Kosovo. Turkey and the U.S. cooperated 
against Serbian aggression. Although there were no direct or e.xistential threats to 
U.S. or Turkish interests, these two states were concerned w'ith peaceful and .stable 
future of the Balkan region in particular and of Burope in general. Moreover, 
Turkey’s eonceni was not totally altruistic. Yugoslavia/Serbia is also an air and land 
corridor for Turkish exports to Europe. Hence with this in mind, Ankara cooperated 
with Washington since a mutual interest in ending wars in the Balkans motivated 
them. It could not be elaimed that there was an unconditional Turkish support for the 
U.S. but in these cases two NATO allies cooperated against a eommon aggressor, 
Slobodan Milosevic.
Other areas in which Turkey needed U.S. political and economic support and 
approval were Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline route, SEEBRIG, Turkish-lsraeli 
military cooperation, BSECZ, and EU membership. In the.se areas U.S. interests were 
not in conflict with Turkish ones; actually, these initiatives helped the U.S. to realize 
its primary goal of preserving its own and its allies’ interests. Hence when looked at 
from this perspective, it might be stated that U.S.-Turkish relationship posses.scd the 
characteristic of being a partnership; however, there was not any challenge to test 
whether the U.S. would support these Turkish initiatives or not if and when they 
opposed some of its own interests. Most probably Washington would not support 
Ankara on occasions that would not promise the U.S. any profit. Additionally, there 
were other areas in which Turkish-U.S. interests clashed.
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Generally U.S. policy toward Middle luistem slates such as Iran. Iraq, and 
Syria ran parallel to Turkey’s policy. However, the U.S. and Turkey did not agree on 
the methods of dealing with lhe.se countries. Ankara could not approve of U.S. 
embargo against Iran or an immediate overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Haghdad that 
could lead to instability in Iraq. Hence such a conditional Turkish support for 
Washington in its Middle Eastern policy .separated Turkey from the United Kingdom 
or Israel, which had already approved U.S. policies. On the other hand. Turkish 
policies toward Amicnia, Greece and Cypnis were also in confliet with U.S. stance 
of ending the decades-long problems as soon as possible.
Seen from the.se di.sputed dimensions, it could be argued that neither Turkey 
nor the U.S. could totally trust one another or support the other uneonditionally. 
There has not been any historical incident to tie Turkey and the U.S. so closely to 
each other in issues that their interests could overlap like Israel or UK. The closeness 
of U.S.-UK relations originate from the common ethnicity they have been sharing, 
while cordial relations with Israel were built just afier the creation of the Israeli state 
in the Middle East. Mainly, with the help of Jewish-Americans in the U.S., good 
relations between Washington and Jeni.salem continued in the subsequent decades. 
Naturally, this does not mean that the former countries* interests are always 100% 
the same as U.S.’, yet they have found common interests to compromise and support 
each other on almo.st all occasions, becau.se of the reciprocal trust in one another.
Nonetheless, Turkey’s not being at the .same level with UK or Israel in terms 
of its relations with the U.S. did not erase its significance for Washington. It was 
viewed that U.S. interests in the region required Washington to take into account 
Turkish concerns and expectations about regional change. This meant that the U.S. 
could not be averse to Turkey’s significant role for the region. And also the U.S.
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should satisfy Turkey and cooperate rviti, it to he Miecesstnl unt. ,:l,.t..,l 
Therefore, it is neeessary to look at rvhether ITS,·Turk,sh relatn.nslnp ,s hoed „„ 
equal footing or not to continue the analy.sis.
4.5 No “Equal Footing” in U.S.-Turkish Relations
The debate over how to define U.S.-lurkish relations during tlic nineties required 
finding an answer to the question of equal footing.* '^ Whether Turkey’s relationship 
with the U.S. was based on equal commitments or tiot would give clues about the 
nature of the relations. Nonetheless, before answeritig this question it would be 
necessary to turn again to the definition of partnership'” , and to recall what the 
requirements of partnership were. By definition a partnership is “a business which 
has more than one owner but is not incorporated, the individual partners remaining 
fully responsible for its debts” namely, for its duties and resiionsibilities. 
Furthermore, “partners need not all be equal: in professional partnerships it is 
common for senior partners to get a larger share of the rewards and do a smaller 
share of the routine work than junior partners.”'^'
This definition of partnership has been visualized by Seyli Tashan. According 
to him, the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. resembled a limiteil company. 
In a limited company, two or more partners might not really have ecpial shaies but 
this still would not change the reality that they are partneis. While one ol the paitneis 
gilt have 90% of the share, and the other had only 10%. the partnership w as stillmi
For details on equality see Reşat Anın. JiiindıJÎLR^^^ onju.u ime. I lee.lom ol .Aei.on,
Equalitv. (Ankara: Dış Politika Fnslilüsii. 2001). pp.S7-107.
^ ^ ^ i  J. Barkey, “The Endless Pursuit", pp. 2.17-.V). Acomlıng lo İnin. .ı Mi.itcitie P-utneish,,, 
“implies a strong and more persuasive rclalionslıip with a democratic, prospe.ons. ..ml s, .t,le t .„key. 
a m L b er o f NATO and ultimately of llıc European Uıııo.ı . I lenee ll.e ı.ı.lıi.ııy p.iiinuslnp K inncui 
Turkey and the U.S. requires having common military and pohi.eal obieemes an.l inieieMs Hut nu.d.i
bring these two states together.
John Black, p. 343.
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present. \et with unec|tial shares. .As seen from this example a partnership between 
two states does not neeessitate e(|ual footing. Ihns. it only tins eharacterislie was 
taken into consideration, it could be eonehided that the relationship between fnrkey 
and the U.S. could be named as a partnership. Ihe II.S. as the senior partner uets the 
larger share of the rew ards, while I iirkey. as the junior partner gets a smaller share.
Neverthele.ss. Turkey’s partnership with the U.S. in the post-Colil War era did 
not reach the level of resembling the partnership between the U.S. and UK or Israel, 
which have already been delined as strategic partners of the U.S. The partnership 
betw'ecn the U.S. and UK has been delmed as “a special relationship" based on 
“military and intelligence cooperation, shared strategic interests, eontiiuied 
endurance of strategic cooperation"'” , ‘nuclear affairs, cultural anil intellectual 
life’.” " Furthermore, the special relationship betw'cen the U.S. and UK originated 
from “common legacy o f liixlory, common ciilliirc, common lanyuayc/cllinic 
parlnersliip, common institutions, personal rcasons/family tics, and race“. '' ' 
Considering l.srael, it is seen that “ l.srael is a dc facto ally of the U.S." and it also 
po.s.se.s.ses “a .speeial relationship” with the U.S. mainly since 19b7 based on mutual 
political and military interests.'""
Scyll Taşlıan, interview on l-l.t)·!.200-1.
('niig Thompson, “IJK-li.S. Slralcj^ic ('oopcratioit”, JllA ( ’oliimn 1/ 2()().V 
www.jiia.or.jp/rcporl/column'0301 lhompson.html
(iidcon Kacliman, “Is Ihc Anglo-American Relationship Still Special?’*. H w  I W is l i i n y jn n  
Q i m r h r l y ,  Vol. 24. No. 2, (Spring 2001). pp.7-20, p. S.
Sedat I.aviner, Ani)-lnuiltere İlişkileri: Т)/еГ Юг İlişki, (Ankara: Avrasya-Hir Vakfı-ASAM. 
2000), pp. 7-10. I’or detailed analyses on the “special relationship" between the U.S. and I IK see C.J. 
Bartlett, * I he Special Relationship’: A {Political History of Aindo-Amcrican Relations since 1045. 
(I.ondon: Longman, 1002): John Dickie. \Special’ No \h)ie: Antdn-American Relations; Rheioiic atuj 
Reality, (London: Weindenfeld iV: Nicolson, 1004); and John Пит!)ге11. A Special Relationship: 
Anelo-American Relations in the ( ’old war and Ai)er. (1 loundsmills: Macmillan Ihess. 2001). 1 hese 
hooks analyze how “special" the relationship has been and uhether it preserves the "special" character 
during the nineties by arguing that UK’s convergence to LTl and its cases threatens the special 
relationship.
Jay ('ristol, “When Did the U.S. and Israel Become Allies?". Center for llistoiy and New Medi.i. 
http:/ hnn.iis articles printlVicndly 7.>l.himl. The special relationship, which is verbalized as an 
alliance, is characterized by three dimensions: “ 1) Shared threat perceptions and commoit security 
interests; 2) Institutionalization in the relationship, and the resulting ability to ride out short term
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Seeing liow cliKereni the rehilionsliip between the I '.S. .md I K or Isr.icl h;is 
been inere.iseil tlie debnte over what was intended by ealhng i iirkes' a str.itegie 
partner like UK and Israel, but not treating it as the same tyjie of an allv. Most 
probably diifeient front the partnership with UK or Israel, the partnershi|i between 
Iiirkey and the U.S. has always laeked and will laek historieal anil ethnie ties. 
Because of this, there has not been imeonditional support and total mutual trust 
betw'een lurkey and the U.S. Otherwise, when one of the partners is in need of help 
the other gives its support usually without que.stioning it or making it eoiulitional. 
While, it W'oukI not be aeeurate to state that the.se states always share the same 
policies, exceptions did not undermine the elose relations in any way. lienee, all 
these characteristics of a partnership are present only in U.S.’ relationship with UK 
and Israel but not with furkey.
Under these circumstances, it w'as viewed that there w'as a gap between these 
two examples of partnership. The relationship betw'een Turkey and the U.S. did not 
really resemble the relationship between the U.S. and UK or Israel and that being 
called a strategie ptirtner verbally would not mean a real partnership in the sense of 
the Israeli or British ca.se. ITom this .standpoint, it is also significant to examine 
whether there was dependeney or interdepeiulency between Turkey and the U.S. that 
is another characteristic of a partnership.
4.6 Strategic Partners are not Dependent But Interdependent
Another debatable issue concerning U.S.-'fuiki.sh relationship was related to the 
correlation between dependence and interdependence. It was widely aeeepted that
policy ilisagrccmcnts in sonic areas; .^ ) .Syinindry anil linnlcn sliaiing; Israeli leeipiocily ami Mippoit 
for American obieelives in the region", (ier;ilil Steinberg, "Israel ami the t hiiteil States: ( an the 
Special Relationship Survive the New Strategie Environment'.’". M i t U l c  I m '.i  Ri-x U w  <<l I n t i  i n i i i n i i i t i l  
A f f a i r s .  Vol. 2. No. 4. (December lOO.S). pp. 61-SI, p. 64. See also Mitchell (i. Haul ami Daniel l’ i|ies.
usually two strategically tied partners arc not dcpciulcnt on each .)thcr but arc 
interdependent. This issue of dcpcndencc/intcrdcpcndcncc has also taken a enieial 
place concerning the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. starting in the Cold 
War. Nevertheless, though the questions of how to define the relationship between 
the U.S. and Turkey, and whether it was based on dependency or intenlependeney 
were still unresolved, the issue increased in signillcanee. The concept of strategic 
partnership began to dominate U.S.’ and Turkey’s agendas in the .second half of the 
nineties, a period governed by relatively successful coalition governments eoin|iared 
to the previous years.
At first sight, it might be thought that U.S.-Turkish relationship was based on 
Turkey’s one-sided dependence on U.S. support. According to some. Turkey was 
dependent on the U.S. and only in the mid-1990s, Turkish officials deeiiled to 
upgrade the strategic partnership with the U.S. to a level of interdepeiulency. 
Additionally, by doing this Turkey would attain a stronger position in NA TO, which 
aimed to increase influence over the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and Central Asian 
regions.'*' Even if it could be argued that the relationship between furkey and the 
U.S. was once based on dependency, it could be stated that in the post-Colil War era 
dependency turned into interdependency since U.S. interests required rurkey’s 
support in major fields. Hence under such circumstances, common interests 
increased the level of interdependency between them. I his means that intenlependent 
states cannot easily dare to lose each other.
Starting with Operation Provide Comfort, the U.S. needed Turkey’s support 
in order to preserve its existence in the region, otherwise, it was known that without
“How Special Is the U.S.-lsracl Rclalionsliip?". MiMU- East Quarterly, oblainc.l from 
hUpV/www.iTicforum.org/pf.plipViiW't*^
Ekavi Athanassopoulou, “Amcrican-Turkish Relations since the l-.iul ol the ( .iKl W ar . ,t/i,/.//,· 
East Policy. Vol. 8, No. 3, (September 2001). pp. N-1-164. p. I.>.'i.
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Turkish support for the operation, Saddam Hussein would regain power in northern 
Iraq. Turkey’s contribution to NATO as a reliable ally ready t.. activate its personnel, 
military bases, and amis was invaluable support for the U.S. that hail veiy few allies 
giving such kind of backing as Turkey did. Generally, the li.S. was also in need of 
Turkey s help for the preservation of stability in the region, l urkey for long has been 
a stabilizing factor in its region by not getting involved in intra-Arab quarrels and by 
promoting the idea of democratic and peaceful living conditions for all states in the 
neighborhood. The U.S. benefited from this stable order proviiled with the help of 
Turkey. Hence it was viewed that not only Turkey needed U.S.’ suiiport but also the 
U.S. needed Turkey’s support in the region to realize its global hegemonic power.
The interdependent U.S.-Turkish relationship is affected by domestie 
developments both in the U.S. and Turkey. During the nineties Turkey suffered many 
politieal and economic crises that sometimes weakened Ankara’s hand in managing 
its relations with the U.S. Among these domestic liabilities were initially di.sabled 
coalition governments. Turkey’s role in the region could really increase when Turkey 
was strong at home. Thus, Ankara first had to fight against corruption at home to be 
stronger in world politics and its relations with the U.S. 1 lowever, on the other side, 
some fundamentalist orientations decreased Ankara’s ability to evaluate its foreign 
policy on an equal stance with the U.S. Nonetheless, the resolution of domestic 
problems, and especially the one concerning Abdullah Ocalan and l*ls.K, gradually 
increased the hope in Turkey that better relations on equal and an interdependent 
footing could be established.
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CHAPTKR 5 
CONCLUSION
It has been seen that the nature of U.S.-Turkish relations durinj: tlic nineties were 
affected by varied exogenous factors, which luive also affected the fate of world 
politics, as well as varied indigenous factors. At the same time. Turkey’s ecoimmie 
and political stability directly influenced Ankara’s bargaining power in the 
international arena, and especially in its relations with the U.S. Whenever Turkey 
was powerful at home, this increased its possibility of being powerl'ul also in its 
immediate region. Nonetheless, being strong at home was not enough to overcome 
all regional disputes. Turkey’s geo-stratcgic importance grew to a level that Turkey 
had to be more cautious than before and to preserve balance in the region. 1 urkey s 
access to new regions such as the Balkans, Middle hast, Caucasus and ( entral Asia 
after a long time required sound policies since all these were also new aieas of 
challenge and opportunity for the U.S. Therefore, success or lailure towaid these 
regions would be directly reflected in U.S.-Iurkish relations. I he mote the U.S. and 
Turkey find common interests in these regions, the more they ilevelop theit
relationship.
Very recently, on April 7, 2004 U.S. Chief of the (ieneral Staff. Richard 
Myers, made a speech in the American-Turkish C’ouneil.' In his speech, there were 
many clues about U.S.-Turkish relationship that could be also applieii to the time 
period discussed in this .study. Myers focu.sed on the importance of U.S.-TTnkish
96
relations both at bilateral and NATO levels, and added that Turkey’s contribution to 
the fight against terrorism and to regional stability "now has hccn more sim licani 
than other Furthermore, Myers likened the U.S.-Turkish relationship to a
marriage with its ups and downs, which necessitates effort to continue,'**  ^ and 
additionally he stressed that he was satisfied with this very important friendship.'*^' 
Besides, according to Myers, Turkey was a "real friend, trade partner and allv \  and 
thus the levels of “cooperation, communication, and information” should be 
furthered.'*^
With these messages Myers tried to calm down increasing Turkish doubts 
about U.S. policies in the Middle East generally and on Iraq particularly. However, 
this speech is also important to analyze the pre-September 11 relationships between 
the U.S. and Turkey. In the last decade of the 20''' century Turkey’s significance was 
also on the U.S. agenda, and the state of being married to each other referred to this 
relationship during the Cold War and its aftermath given the chauvinistic analogy 
about marriage. Nonetheless, it is debatable whether this marriage satisfied and still 
satisfies either partner. It is also doubtable whether in this marriage the powerful 
partner exploited and still intends to exploit the weaker one. Moreover, it is 
important to question whether this marriage preserved and still preserves the interests 
of each partner. Another crucial argument that might probably be the most 
convenient statement explaining this marriage was that it resembled a Catholic 
marriage. In a Catholic marriage neither side could really get rid of the other even if
The meetings in the American-Turkish Council (A TC) svere made annually and this year Richard 
Myers was among the guest speakers. Comments on this speech were publiei/cd by dilferent 
newspapers in Turkey. Radikal and Sahalı were two of these newspapers focusing on Myers speech.
Ash Aydıntaşbaş, “Dostluğumuz hiç bu kadar önemli olmamıştı (Our friendship has never been as 
important as it is now)”, Sabah, 08.04.2004. htlir/Avww.sabah.e()in.lr/20(l4/()4/0S-'uiull.Vl.hlinl The 
italics are author’s since the news were in Turkish and the journalist also quoted Myers’ words. 
Sabah and Radikal, on 08.04.2004.
Sabah, 08.04.2004.
/?a(//to/,08.04.2004.
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one party intends to do this because of the dogmas that could not be changed.'"' riic 
marriage between Turkey and the U.S. has always depended on common interests 
tying them closely to each other as in tlie dogmas of medieval Catholieism. In other 
words, it is a marriage of convenience where the scope of mutual tolerance is limited 
by heavy hardness.
Neither Turkey nor the U.S. could give up being an ally of the other since the 
hegemonic power of the U.S. and its global interests requires having sound relations 
with Turkey to carry out U.S. policies in the region. On the other side, despite the 
fact that Turkey did not always share the same ideas and policies with the U.S., 
Ankara was in need of a strong ally and supporter of its main foreign objectives such 
as EU membership, fight against terrorist PKK, and financial support for Bakii- 
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil/gas transportation in the international arena. Despite some areas of 
dispute the U.S. has been the most significant contributor to political, military and 
economic stability in Turkey. Hence, it could be argued that Turkey and the U.S. 
have been two important partners. There is a wholesome and essential relationship 
between Turkey and the U.S. that neither side could afford to lose the other in the 
foreseeable future.
In the post-Cold War decade, the discourse primarily focu.sed on by the U.S. 
was that Turkey’s role in its immediate environment would increase and that Turkey 
would become more important for U.S. interests was welcomed in some circles in 
Turkey. Turkey as a result of support both from outside and inside was drawn into 
expectations impossible to realize. It was noteworthy that not only foreign policy 
makers’ but also scholars and strategists overestimated Turkey’s increasing 
significance in its region. More specifically, by exaggerating Turkey’s significance
187 Nur Bilge Criss, discussion made with the author regarding Myers' speech. 0S.04.2()()4.
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for the U.S. more than necessary or by wishing tliis to come tnic. tljcsc strategists 
caused many discussions in Turkey. For that reason, the issue tliat furkey was a 
strategic partner of the U.S. became one of tlie major polemics during the iy9()s 
and even at the beginning of 2000s.***’* Hence both in their artieles and oral 
statements, the strategists, who defended the idea that Turkey became a strategie 
partner for the U.S., put for\vard this claim because of Ankara’s increased role in the 
region.
Nevertheless, what these experts perceived from a strategic partnership or at 
least what they wanted to perceive from it did not reach the level of their 
expectations. These people by overemphasizing Turkey’s importance mistakenly got 
the impression that in the post-Cold War circumstances Turkey might rise to the 
level of UK, Israel, or Canada in the eyes of the U.S. According to them, this meant 
that in the developing world conditions Turkey moved to a more crucial position in 
world politics that is to say for the U.S., Turkey might become equal to Israel or UK. 
However, the situation was not the same as thc.se Turkish scholars thought that it had 
been.
It was explicitly well known that Turkey had and still has a crucial place I'or 
the protection of U.S. interests, yet Turkey’s significance coukl not be consideretl 
equal to either that of Israel or the United Kingdom. In real sense, from U.S. 
perspective Turkey’s importance did not reach the level of being called “a strategic 
partner” in Israeli or British terms. Namely, when looked at the relations between the 
U.S. and Turkey, it was immediately viewed that furkish ties with the U.S. ilid not 
rely on ethnic and historical basics as with UK or human and social basics as with 
Israel. In that case since the beginning points were not the .same so the finishing
Ümit Özdağ. Among these strategists who overestimated l urkey's role in tlie region Cengiz 
Çandar was a forerunner.
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points should be different. That is to .say there is a great difference in tite meaning of 
strategic partnership regarding the country it is applied to. However, tliis i s not tlie 
end of the relationship between Turkey and the U.S., eontrar)' to this, tlie eontinuitv 
of Turkish-Amcrican relations will be preserved in dillerent levels anyhow. 
Moreover, polemics referred to above did not even consider the price to be paid for 
strategic partnership, as American over-reaction in Iraq unfoUled.
On the other side, if strategic partnership is accepted as “a military closeness” 
and “a business partnership” as has been defined by Seyfi T’a^han, it could be 
claimed that the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. was a partnership. It has 
been noteworthy that Turkey and the U.S. have been two countries militarily close to 
each other because of their overlapping common interests and because of being 
NATO allies. Hence usually they acted together when they shared common interests. 
Cooperation in the Balkans concerning the war in Bosnia and Kosovo, and Midiile 
East, where Turkey supported U.S. policies were among many e.xamples of 
overlapping interests with the global power, the U.S. and regional power, T'urkcy. 
Neither historical tics nor ethnic ties between the U.S., Israel, and the UK, are 
present between the U.S. and Turkey. The mutual importance given to U.S.-TTirkish 
relationship was explicitly viewed in the pre-September 11 periods however: there 
has not been any cycs-widc-shut trust between Turkey and the U.S. Nevertheless, 
maybe this is the healthiest approach to bilateral relations.
Another crucial clement that brought T urkey and the U.S. together was the 
alliance within NATO. Since 1952 Turkey proved to be a reliable ally of the U.S. 
within NATO structures, and even in the nineties Turkey supported the iiiea of 
transformation of NATO and the enlargement of NATO. T herefore. Turkey’s role in 
NATO and U.S. need of Turkey’s contribution to NAT O have alreaily tied T urkey
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and the U.S. Being allies within NAIO was the major frame that overlapped their 
common interests, and most probably there was not a necessity to look for other 
concepts such as strategic partnership to define their relationship. As limit O/dag 
pointed, it was urgent to build U.S.-l urkish relations on a sound framework aiul 
NATO was this basic framework. He continued by saying that neither Ciermans nor 
Spanish, nor even French were after being called strategic partners of the U.S., since 
they have already been allies within NATO, the fundamental defense organization.'
Seen from the above-made analyses related to rurkish-American relations in 
the post-Cold War era, it could be argued that Turkey e.xperieneed a survival test 
among many global and regional developments in world politics and as well as 
problems in the domestic sphere. Under these circumstances, the importance of U.S.- 
Turkish alliance and the backbone of their relationship have been put into the agenda 
and have been discussed. In this new decade, Turkey’s role for the preservation of 
U.S. global and regional interests has accelerated. On the other hand, furkey faced 
new opportunities and challenges to determine and follow its own independent 
foreign policy as an emerging regional power but without ignoring U.S. interests.
Under the conditions of the new world order, it could be claimed that Turkey 
and the U.S. came closer within NATO alliance and as a result of overlapping 
common interests. During the 1990s the already e.xisting allied relationship between 
the U.S. and Turkey has been improved and diversified with different opportunities 
of cooperation especially in the Balkan.s and C aucasus. On the other hand, the 
problematic issues such as Turkish relation.s with Cireece and Armenia, oi it.s Middle 
Eastern neighbors of Iraq, Iran, or Syria has provided significant opportunities for
' Omit Ozdag, I2.07.200.t.
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Turkey and the U.S. to test the essentiality of their rclationsliip since tlicy have 
challenged each other on these problems.
During the 1990s, the U.S. had tried to keep Turkey at arm's length by 
increasing the levels of cooperation and supporting Turkish initiatives for regional 
stability such as BSECZ and SEEBRIG since Turkey had already started to gain 
political and military power in its region. The U.S. could not afford to lose a reliable 
NATO ally in an unpredictable and unstable region where U.S. interests were at 
stake. As a response to U.S. backing, Turkey was in hamiony with the U.S. and its 
regional policies to the extent that U.S. policies were not in conflict with Turkish 
national interests. Furthermore, the increasing debates over strategic partnership 
between Turkey and the U.S. in the late nineties seem to preserve its importance in 
the following years. However, when the pre-September 11, conditions arc taken into 
consideration, it is viewed that there has not really been a necessity to become a 
strategic partner to continue its relations with the U.S.
It was and still is an arguable issue of whether Turkish relationship with the 
U.S. should be equal to the one with UK or Israel or not. It has been debated whether 
being a strategic partner of the U.S. has been a desirable objective for Turkey. If this 
level were realized anyhow, the advantages and disadvantages of being a U.S. 
partner would have to be taken into account. The most important benefit of being a 
U.S. partner for Turkey would be mutual trust and unconditional support for Turkish 
cases in problems with its neighbors as it has been with many occasions related to 
UK and Israel. The U.S. has usually sided with Israel or supported Israeli cases in the 
disputes with Palestine and other Middle Eastern states. However, on the other hand, 
being a U.S. partner would mean sharing the responsibilities of American activities
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all over the world and support U.S. policies at any cost as UK aiul Israel diti in the 
Middle East, Balkans and Caueasus during the nineties and even today.
In eonelusion it eould be e.xpressed that in the last decade of the 2()"‘ century', 
cooperation in the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia has provided the 
ground for U.S.-Turkish relations. Both Turkey and the U.S. are in need of each 
other in this decade and this need increa.sed especially afier September 11. since this 
incident has pointed the cs.sentiality of Turkey’s support in the fight against 
terrorism. Therefore, it seems that neither Turkey nor the U.S. could afford to give 
up the support given by their ally despite .some areas of confrontation. Even when 
looked at from a realist point of view, there was not a concrete rea.son to destroy the 
relationship between Turkey and the U.S., two NATO allies loyal to the alliance and 
each other. Moreover, both global and regional developments necessitate the 
continuity of Turkish-Amcrican relationship whether it is named a strategic 
partnership or not. The incidents of the nineties have demonstrated that furkey and 
the U.S. will act together as long as their common interests overlap. It was 
noteworthy that the level of Turkish-American relationship was not as “special" as it 
has been with UK or Israel and Ankara cannot be called a strategic partner of the 
U.S. in the sense of Israel or UK, yet, the U.S.-Turkish relationship is significant 
enough and this significance will be preserved in the post-September 11 period, 
however within reasonable bounds.
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